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1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Preface 
A picture appeared on the front page of the Norwegian development monthly, 
Bistandsaktuelt, entitled: “Woodlanders with money”1.  The image  is of three 
men walking on a path surrounded by forest. In the middle we see the Norwegian 
Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg flanked by the Norwegian Minster of 
Environment and Development, Erik Solheim, and the Brazilian Minister of 
Environment, Carlos Minc. They all look happy, relaxed and satisfied. The 
photographer‟s choice of moment of exposure creates an illusion which is hard to 
refrain from commenting on; that is, how the three men appear to be holding 
                                              
1 My own english translation: Bistandsaktuelt nr 7 - 2009. 
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hands. The picture may be symbolic of some form of shared unity between the 
three ministers and between the countries of Brazil and Norway. 
 
The picture is shot on the 17
th
 of September 2008 during the ministers‟ stay in 
Latin America. The visit to the rainforest was made because of the newly 
launched Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative where Brazil is one of the key 
partners. During the same visit, Stoltenberg opened a Norwegian pavilion at an 
oil/gas exhibition (Rio Oil and Gas), opened a Norwegian-Brazilian offshore 
seminar, took part in an event focusing on Norwegian “klippfisk” (dry and salted 
cod) and marked the 25 years jubilee of Norwegian support to indigenous 
development
2
. His schedule illustrates in many ways the main interests in the 
Norwegian-Brazilian relationship: oil and gas, development aid, trade, and now 
the recently added rainforest through the Norwegian Climate and Forest 
Initiative. 
 
Almost two years after this ministerial promenade in May 2010, Oslo and 
Norway are currently the focus of international climate and forest attention. The 
Norwegian involvement for a global good has been manifested in the Oslo 
Climate and Forest Conference. In less than three years,  the rainforest has 
become a number one concern in the Norwegian climate and development policy. 
This swift evolution of importance and the huge dimensions of the projects call 
for some questions. 
                                              
2 http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/smk/statsministerens-
kontor/statsminister_jens_stoltenberg/kalender.html?id=434566 
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1.2 The research questions 
How did Stoltenberg and Solheim end up in the middle of the Amazonian 
rainforest? And how did the rainforest suddenly appear as a crucial and important 
part of Norwegian development aid, as well as the relationship between Norway 
and the global south? As the Director General in NORAD, Poul Engeberg-
Pedersen pointed out at a climate and forest seminar in October 2007, in the 
course of a few years, 2007-2010, the protection of rainforest has become one of 
the most interesting elements in Norwegian development policy. What has 
actually happened and what sort of dynamics is unfolding itself in the process of 
implementing the Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative? Why did the 
rainforest appear as an attractive idea for Norway and other actors? And are there 
some elements in this Norwegian narrative about climate and rainforest that are 
neglected? My principal idea is that I, through a deeper understanding of this 
process, will also be confronted with some of the deeper and more general 
features of Norwegian climate and development policies. 
 
With this in mind, I have interviewed different actors involved in the initiative, as 
well as bureaucrats, NGO activists and researchers. These interviews, together 
with the use of literature, an analysis of official documents and publications and 
some elements of the observational approach will hopefully give me some 
answers to how and why Stoltenberg and Solheim suddenly appeared in the 
Amazonian rainforest. 
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1.3 Rationale for my thesis 
My interest in this topic has evolved out of an overall interest in development 
policy and how Norway relates to the world through different development 
initiatives and how these are talked about, explained and understood in a 
Norwegian political context. I was therefore in search of a case study which 
could reveal this relationship. The Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative was 
then a somewhat ideal case to investigate. Because I was not interested in this out 
of a genuine interest in deforestation issues or the climate threat, I therefore 
encountered two almost new areas for me to investigate with new knowledge that 
had to be gained. My theoretical framework is therefore to some extent 
dominated by development theory, but my aim is to show that by using critical 
development theory, certain important aspects of this initiative can be revealed - 
aspects which are often obscured in the principal speech about the initiative. I add 
to this a presentation of different narratives and discourses that have dominated in 
environmental development.  
 
My interest in Norwegian development policy leads me to also include a 
discussion on how this policy is connected to a constructed self-image of Norway 
as a small and altruistic actor in the global landscape of development. The 
discrepancies in Norway‟s image are an important backdrop for a deeper 
understanding of Norwegian involvement. Once more, there are elements that are 
obscured which have to be taken into account. 
 
My research is concentrated on interviews with Norwegian actors. How they 
think, act and experience the initative is central for my thesis. This has provided 
me with valuable information about the initiative; how it has evolved since 2007, 
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which events have been important, who are the involved actors and what sort of 
reaction a huge initiative like this has induced among the involved parties. What 
surprised me most in this process was the contrast between the political leaders‟ 
reasoning and the bureaucrats working on implementing the plans behind the 
rhetoric.   
6 
 
2. Methodology 
I will use a multiple methodological approach, but my main tool will be 
qualitative, in-depth and open-ended interviews with a selection of key 
informants. This will, nevertheless, be supplemented by complementary methods 
such as an observational approach “in the field” and a more text based approach.  
2.1 My informants 
My focus area or field is the Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative and the 
people and institutions working directly and indirectly with this initiative. I have 
interviewed bureaucrats in The Norwegian Agency of Development Cooperation 
(NORAD), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD), the Ministry of Environment 
(MD), NGO representatives from Rainforest Foundation Norway (RFN), Friends 
of the Earth Norway, Greenpeace Norway and been in e-mail contact with the 
editor in charge of the REDD-monitor blog. I have also had further 
conversational interviews with different scientists involved in some way or 
another in REDD related research at the Department of International 
Environment and Development (NORAGRIC) and the Department of Economics 
and Resource Management at the Norwegian University of Life Science (UMB), 
the Centre for International Climate Environmental Research- Oslo (CICERO) 
and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). 
2.2 Why interview? 
The first question that surfaced after choosing the Norwegian REDD initiative as 
a research topic was what methodological approach I should settle on. My 
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decision about doing my research at a policy level in Norway, and among 
Norwegian REDD actors, made it natural to focus on the qualitative interview as 
my main strategy. My main object of study is the different actors‟ plans and ideas 
about what they are doing. Interviews can reveal particular insights into the 
different informants‟ experiences, ideas and thoughts about the Norwegian 
REDD-initiative. There are, however, contrasting viewpoints regarding to which 
extent interviews can reveal “truths” about the world. A positivistic approach 
would say that the informant description of reality is correct and the researcher is 
only seen as neutral mediator of this told truth. The opposite approach, 
constructivism, would argue that the information you get from your informant is 
context bound and is only created in a space/time specific relation between 
informant and interviewer. Real experiences from the world outside of the 
interview situation are therefore not unaffectedly and neutrally transferred in an 
interview (Thagaard 2006:83). An interview can therefore not give you valid data 
about the reality, and answers can vary as a result of differing contexts, as well as 
through the way in which the informants perceive the interviewer. In this 
landscape between positivism and constructivism we are in need of a middle 
ground. Thagaard (2006) argues that it is possible to acknowledge both that data 
collected through interviews offers more or less true descriptions about the 
informants‟ lives, but is also, at the same time, a reflection of how the informants 
understand their own experiences and how the interaction occurs in the interview 
situation.    
 
Based on experiences from different interviews with a wide range of informants  
I can of course find examples on informant-interviewer relations that have 
worked better than others, but for my type of research, this has not changed my 
findings significantly. The fact that my research topic is more or less only related 
to the professional and impersonal life of my informants make these objections 
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less relevant for my data collection. The data I am asking for in my interviews 
concentrates on the professional lives of my informants, not their private lives, 
and it is therefore perhaps more neutral and less influenced by the interview 
setting or the relation between the two of us. It is, of course, difficult to draw a 
line between the private and professional life, but I believe a constructivist 
argument is more valid when the interview topics are more related to the personal 
life of the informant than a more abstract topic such as the Norwegian Climate 
and Forest Initiative. 
2.3 Challenges related to using interviews 
With this in mind, it is not to say that there are no challenges related to the use of 
the interview as a method in this field. Terje Tvedt (2003), one of the most 
important researchers on Norwegian development policy, claims that to use 
interviews as a method in this field has several drawbacks. One of them is that 
theNorwegian development system‟s descriptions of itself are so dominating that 
the individual actors will have difficulties to talk beyond the system‟s own 
language. He also sees great difficulties in moving beyond the rhetorical grip of 
the system; such as how, for example, the use of phrases like “we have learned” 
and “we were stupid before” are making their current decisions, actions and ideas 
more valid. Tvedt, who likes to invent new terms, calls this “contemporary 
imperialism” (Tvedt 2003:323). 
 
In addition to this, the bureaucratic language can create some conversational 
obstacles. It is, for example, difficult to get valid data about what an informant 
thinks about certain matters if she only talks in general terms. Here interviews 
can be in danger of producing uninteresting data. I will nevertheless argue that 
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their statements can be very useful for my research. Despite their use of vague 
and bureaucratic language, my informants‟ statements have presented many 
interesting and revealing representations on how this system thinks, works and 
interacts within itself, within the Norwegian society and in its contact with the 
rest of the world. It is also notable how I have often met bureaucrats who actually 
were allowing themselves to think more freely than others. 
 
My aim is that through a selection of key-informants both inside and outside the 
Climate and Forest Initiative I will be able to transcend the language of the 
system and also maintain a nuanced and perhaps critical approach to it. It is also 
important to remember that, even though the dominant Norwegian development 
language influences my informants, their statements can provide evidence on the 
way in which different stakeholders express themselves and think about the 
initiative. Perhaps it is exactly their way of talking and their understanding that I 
am searching for? With this in mind, I believe that interviews are a good method 
to use in this context. My use of observation and text analysis will also 
complement the interviews in the research. In this way I can triangulate my field 
of study.  
2.4 Observation 
I have, as mentioned above, also made some observations throughout my research 
period. I have participated in seminars and meetings related to the initiative and 
the stakeholders whenever possible. The way people talk, interact, and resolve 
disagreements and put forward different ideas and scenarios has been very useful 
for me. I have, through this, gained a deeper understanding of different aspects of 
the initiative. 
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I have been taking part in and observed on a one-day REDD seminar. This was 
arranged by NORAD where the different ministries took part as well as the 
NGOs, media and research institutions. In the end of my data collecting period I 
took part in an afternoon seminar also arranged by NORAD, where Arild 
Angelsen from UMB presented his new edited book on REDD published by The 
Center of International Forestry Research (CIFOR). Interestingly enough, several 
of my informants from the bureaucracy were participating and discussing REDD 
openly. This somehow coincidental experience ended up being very fruitful for 
my data collection. I have also been participating in several academic seminars 
where important Norwegian and international researchers have discussed REDD 
related issues. This has also been very fruitful for my study.  
2.5 Text analysis 
I have, in addition to interviews and observation, also used text-based analysis for 
mapping out the political and discursive context of the Climate and Forest 
Initiative. I have used project descriptions, official reports, speeches, public 
debates, declarations and relevant literature – to get an overview of the 
Norwegian positions on REDD and how the initiative has evolved more 
historically. The website of the Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative, as well 
as the REDD-monitor-blog and the Mongabay website have been particularly 
important resources for a variety of information and knowledge. 
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3. REDD 
3.1 REDD – a multifaceted acronym  
REDD is an acronym for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest 
Degradation. The goal is that REDD can be part of a post-2012 climate regime 
and end up as a potential climate partnership between the global north and the 
global south. The relatively new acronym REDD has therefore become important 
in global discourses about climate, environment and development. This chapter 
begins with a short outline of how REDD, as a term and policy approach, has 
evolved internationally in recent years. The difficulties in doing so are that the 
principles of REDD are both disputed and continually in flux. Nevertheless, it is 
possible and necessary to provide some description of REDD and how it can be 
defined.  
 
A very straightforward way to put it, is to say that REDD is the idea, or based on 
the idea, that maintains that by putting a value on living trees we can make them 
worth more alive than dead. A more technical definition of REDD is found in the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 
Bali Action Plan (2007). The action plan describes REDD as;  
“Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and 
the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of 
forest carbon stocks in developing countries.”  
The latest addition to this is to use REDD+ as the accurate acronym. The plus 
sign indicates that the enhancement of carbon stocks is also taken into account 
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(Angelsen 2009:2). Since my thesis does not have predominant focus on these 
more technical distinctions in REDD-discussion, I will continue to use the less 
cumbersome REDD, without the plus sign. It is however, still important to be 
aware of this distinct detail. 
 
As Arild Angelsen (2009) points out, REDD “has evolved as a concept and 
means different things to different countries, organisations and individuals”. The 
latest book edited by Angelsen; “Realising REDD+ National strategy and policy 
option” (2009), uses REDD+ as “an umbrella term for local, national and global 
actions that reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation”. It is 
also important to add that REDD is “a shorthand for both a set of policies or 
actions that aim to reduce emissions and increase removals, and for the final 
outcomes of those policies or actions” (Angelsen 2009:2). This considered, 
REDD is a truly multifaceted acronym, which can create some misunderstanding 
and difficulties in talking about it, but may at the same time open a space for 
interpretations for the different actors involved with REDD. If we want to obtain 
a deeper understanding of REDD and policies connected to the initiative, it is 
important to investigate how different actors see REDD as different things and 
how this diverse area of understanding is used by the same actors to create 
meanings which fit their visions of reality. 
3.2 Actors involved 
REDD involves and is supported by a conglomeration of actors on local, national, 
regional and global level. Nation states from both the global north and south, 
different NGOs, multilateral organisations, regional funds and private business 
actors interact in different REDD defined actions. In the global south we see the 
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big tropical forest countries such as Brazil, Indonesia and Congo, but we also 
find smaller countries which are relatively important REDD-actors such as, for 
instance, Papua New-Guinea, Guyana, Liberia, Vietnam and a dry forest country 
like Tanzania. The UN-REDD programme incorporates nine pilot countries: 
Tanzania, Zambia, DR Congo, Indonesia, Papua New-Guinea, Vietnam, 
Paraguay, Panama and Bolivia. 
 
Talking about involved actors in the global north is more difficult, because we do 
not know yet how REDD will develop and who will, in the end, be the most 
important contributors. Until now, Norway has tried to set the standard by 
committing US$600 million a year to support REDD activities in different 
countries and through different channels. The commitment of others is not that 
certain, but in Copenhagen, COP 15 December 2009 resulted in six countries: 
France, UK, USA, Japan and Australia in addition to Norway, promising 3, 5 
billion dollars to immediate REDD action during the period of 2010-2012. 
Germany was supposed to join this group but left it at a late stage in the COP 15 
negotiations. They nevertheless have their own initiative that may be incorporated 
at a later stage 
3
. Many of these countries and others are also involved through 
multilateral institutions. Of the multilateral institutions involved in REDD, we 
find the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) which are all involved via the abovementioned UN-REDD 
programme. The World Bank is involved through the Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility (FCPF) and Forest Investment Programme (FIP). International NGOs 
involved in REDD are numerous and include NGOs working with an array of 
agendas including climate, environment, development, livelihood, indigenous 
                                              
3 Germany was in May 2010 part of an extended REDD financing initiative.  
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people and rights issues. As a curiosity worth mentioning, we note the Prince of 
Wales Rainforest Project, where the Prince, through his project, wishes to work 
toward a goal of “making the forests worth more alive than dead” (PRP 2007).  
We also have a growing number of national and regional funds also established in 
relation to REDD, such as the Amazon Fund and the Congo Basin Fund. Last but 
not least, we observed more business-oriented actors in the form of carbon traders 
and multinational corporations. One of the most influential firms in the world 
today is, for example, Goldman Sachs. It is difficult to say how influential they 
have been with regard to REDD, but Sjur Kasa, senior research fellow at 
CICERO, indicates that they have been a promoting part of the process. He adds 
that we also have to keep in mind that the city of London sees the global carbon 
market as hopefully growing to becoming the biggest of the future financial 
markets. Additionally, the substantial amount of financing that REDD requires 
has to be obtained from the private market. At the Carbon Trading Summit in 
2010, which Goldman Sachs attended, the primary target was, for example, to 
create “the world‟s largest commodity market in carbon-backed securities”4. 
These interests are often linked with one or more of the aforementioned actors. 
The trend is, as I explore more in-depth later in the thesis, that actors who 
previously saw themselves as enemies, and also were interpreted as such, now 
collaborate in new and unusual alliances between forest companies, financial 
institutions, businesses and NGOs, communities, and states.  
 
It is interesting then to see how all these different actors, despite their differing 
agendas and ideas about the world, have one thing in common: they find the idea 
of REDD attractive. The question is, therefore: why is REDD seen as such an 
attractive idea? When writing about multilateral institutions and development, 
                                              
4 http://latimesdaily.com/2010/05/15/khadija-sharife-redd-seeing-the-forest-for-the-trees/ 
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Bøås and McNeill (2004:11) state that: “For an idea to be attractive to 
multilateral institutions it must (…) be possible to adapt or distort it in 
accordance with already existing problem definitions of development”. This 
quote is not only applicable for multilateral institutions, but for all actors 
involved in the REDD initiative. The initiative is shaped in such a way that it fits 
with the different actors‟ discursive toolboxes. At the same time, we see that the 
initiative can be interpreted as many different things and has a relatively open 
area in which to manoeuvre, so that different actors with different agendas can 
find it attractive. It is within this generous manoeuvring space that Norway also 
navigates and where different Norwegian actors are finding themselves.  
3.3 Paying for Environmental Services (PES) 
The first steps towards a REDD initiative were taken at the COP 11 in Montreal 
in 2005, where Papua New-Guinea and Costa Rica put forward a proposal called 
“Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries: approaches to 
simulative action”. The two countries were part of the Coalition of Rainforest 
Countries (CfRN) and it is this initiative that later developed into REDD
5
. The 
person behind this process is worth mentioning. Joseph Conrad, who is a close 
friend of the Prime Minister in Papua New Guinea, Michael Somare, had 
suggested in 2003 that the Prime Minister ask for financial compensation from 
the world community for the anti-deforestation conditions that came from the 
World Bank. It was this suggestion that gave the birth to what we now know of as 
REDD. Conrad is now the executive director of CfRN, a coalition which 
promotes the trading of carbon stored in forests:  “The Rainforest Coalition seeks 
to incorporate certified emissions offsets related to deforestation (in addition to 
aforestation and reforestation) within global carbon emissions markets by 
                                              
5 Interestingly, Costa Rica is not, at least so far, aspiring for REDD-funding. 
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revising the Marrakech Accords, amending the Kyoto Protocol, or developing a 
linked „optional protocol‟ under the UNFCCC”6. 
 
Before 2005, we find different initiatives targeting both deforestation and forest 
degradation. One of these is Paying for Environmental Services (PES) which has, 
since the 1990s, been introduced as an economic instrument to fight deforestation 
and environmental degradation. The instrument is designed to give economic 
incentives to land users to protect their environment, in such a way that it can 
continue to provide certain ecosystem services such as water, carbon or 
biodiversity that will have a broader benefit for certain users or the society as a 
whole (FAO 2008). The instrument is then designed so that a buyer who values 
environmental services can pay the land users supplying the services “if, and only 
if, the seller actually delivers the environmental service” (Angelsen 2009:316). 
This performance-based system is continued as an important part of the REDD-
structure, where payments are supposed to be made for emissions reductions from 
reduced deforestation and forest degradation.  
 
In the beginning REDD was seen as only PES. The critics to such a REDD-
design are concerned about how a PES-focus may turn REDD into a market-
based programme with only market-based solutions. If REDD ends up in mainly 
PES-like projects, this will be seen as a massive privatisation of the forest sector  
- so maintained Pål Vedeld, professor at NORAGRIC in an interview.  There are, 
nevertheless, strong indications that REDD is going in a more market-based 
direction. 
                                              
6 http://www.rainforestcoalition.org/eng/initiatives/carbon_emissions.php 
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Related to the PES discussion on REDD is the discussion on CDM (Clean 
Development Mechanism). CDM is an offset mechanism that is part of the article 
12 of the Kyoto Protocol. The mechanism is designed so that Annex I countries 
(the developed countries) can meet their emissions reduction targets through 
investments in clean development projects in Annex II countries (developing 
countries). Looking at CDM as part of a possible future of REDD is 
controversial, but important for many of the REDD actors.  
3.4 IPCC and the Stern Report 
After the COP 11 in Montreal, there have been two reports that are often 
mentioned as milestones in the history of REDD. The fourth IPCC report on 
climate change is one of them and was launched in 2007. The report first stated 
that emissions from the global north had to be reduced by 25 – 40% by 2020, 
while the increased emissions from the global south had to be stemmed by 2020 
and the world as a whole had to reduce emissions by 50 – 85 % by 2050. In 
addition, IPCC stated that the peak in global emissions must occur in the period 
between 2000 and 2015 (IPCC 2007). This was not new information, but these 
goals were seen as further away from being realised than ever. It was important to 
look at new solutions and IPCC stated that approximately 17.4% of 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions stems from forestry (including 
deforestation). When writing about mitigation efforts, it then states that: 
“Financial incentives (national and international) to increase forest area, to 
reduce deforestation and to maintain and manage forests; land-use regulation and 
enforcement” has the potential to be environmentally effective in the climate 
change efforts (IPCC 2007). 
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Before the IPCC report, the Stern Report was released in October 2006.. The 
report, which was commisioned by the British Government, discusses the effects 
of climate change and global warming on the world economy. The conclusion 
was that if 1% of global GDP is invested in curbing the deforestation rate, the 
worst effect of climate change can be hindered. This will also save the world 
from a global GDP loss of 20% (The Stern Report 2006). It is seen as 
economically beneficial to try to do something about the deforestation rate. The 
report claims that what we now only know as REDD can be both relatively cheap 
and easy in comparison with other climate efforts, and this statement was 
tempting for many policy makers. Among those is the Norwegian Prime Minister 
and social economist, Jens Stoltenberg. 
3.5 Three phased approach 
The REDD-architecture is still in process, but several countries have put forward 
a proposal for a three-phased approach to how REDD can function in a post-2012 
climate regime. This three-phased approach will be featured by policy designing, 
consultations, consensus building and testing and evaluation (Angelsen et al. 
2009:3). At present, all national REDD-strategies are in phase 1. Such an 
approach includes: 
- PHASE 1: An initial support instrument that allows countries to access 
immediate international funding for national REDD strategy 
development, including national dialogue, institutional strengthening, 
and demonstration activities. 
- PHASE 2: A fund-based instrument that allows countries to access 
predictable REDD finance, based upon agreed criteria. Continued 
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funding under this instrument would be result-based, but performance 
would not necessarily be monitored or measured only on the basis of 
emissions and removals against reference levels. 
- PHASE 3: A GHG-based instrument that rewards performance on the 
basis of quantified forest emissions and removals against agreed 
reference levels (Angelsen et al. 2009:3). 
 
One of the reasons why forest was not seen as viable and not included in climate 
negotiations earlier was that there was no developed credible system for 
monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of deforestation and forest 
degradation. Such a system is now closer to becoming fully viable and is 
developed simultaneously through all these phases. Data on both land use change 
and carbon stocks will be collected. This process implies many challenges, 
especially in countries where allocating enough resources for monitoring may be 
difficult. Remote sensing using new satellite technology is one of the proposed 
solutions to this problem. Funds then have to be made available for developing 
countries so that they may be part of national monitoring systems (Angelsen et al. 
2009:21). The Norwegian position on this is that developed countries have to 
provide resources for capacity building on MRV in developing countries
7
. 
 
                                              
7 See for example: http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/norway090209b.pdf 
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4. Theoretical framework 
4.1 Modernization and dependency 
Development is seen as one of the most central and dominating ideas of the 20
th
 
century. Different theoretical frameworks have been created to not only 
understand, but also improve and criticize the phenomenon and the practices 
attached to the developmental idea. Modernization theory and the oppositional 
dependency theory were the main theoretical directions in this regard. While the 
modernization school saw development as an evolutionary process in which poor 
countries were supposed to climb the ladder of development or reach different 
stages of industrialisation and economic growth, the dependency theorist was 
critical and more concerned about the way in which all countries are 
interconnected and not isolated entities. They saw development and 
underdevelopment as causally linked to each other. They argued that 
development in the centre of the world system was dependent on 
underdevelopment in the periphery. Development and underdevelopment were 
seen as two opposed concepts interconnected through relations of power. 
Dependency theorists focused on these power relations and how the centre 
exploited the periphery, but what they failed to question was the content of the 
development concept itself and the two categories that were produced, namely 
developed and underdeveloped economies/countries. Dependency theory has 
however, taught us an important lesson through bringing to light an 
understanding of causality in time and space in the analysis of the relation 
between poverty and wealth in the world. Nustad (2003:85) uses the term 
simultaneity to refer to this causality in time and place and notes: 
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As long as time has been used to explain differences in development, it has been 
possible to ignore relations between underdeveloped and developed countries. 
However, when dependency theorists insisted on a contemporary understanding, these 
relations were emphasised as an explanation of poverty. Dependency theory‟s focus on 
external connections appears in this way, a result of an insistence upon simultaneity
8
. 
 
This insistence upon simultaneity is central to my thesis. I want to argue that 
simultaneity is still often ignored. This ignorance of simultaneity calls for a closer 
investigation of that which followed modernization and dependency – post-
development theory. 
4.2 Critical development theory  
In the late 1980s, a group of poststructuralist authors began to analyse 
development as a powerful discourse. A discourse is a certain way to talk about 
and understand the World (or a part of the World). Discourse analysis is to 
“investigate how people strategically use the available discourses to portray 
themselves and the world in certain (advantageous) ways” (Jørgensen and Philips 
1999:9, 16). “Thinking of development as a discourse makes it possible to 
maintain the focus of domination (…) and at the same time to explore more 
                                              
8
 My own english translation. Original quote: så lenge forskjell i tid ble brukt til å 
forklare forskjell i utvikling, var det mulig å se bort fra relasjoner mellom 
underutviklete og utviklete land. Når avhengihetsteoretikerne derimot insisterte på 
samtid, ble plutselig relasjonene løftet frem som årsaksforklaring på fattigdom. På 
denne måten fremstår avhengihetsteoriens fokus på de eksterne forbindelsene som et 
resultat av insisteringen på samtidighet.  
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fruitfully the conditions of possibility and the most pervasive effects of 
development” (Escobar 1995:5-6). Post-development theorists‟ main claim, 
expressed very bluntly, is that development as a project does not work. They 
question the whole development/underdevelopment-dichotomy and its content. 
Wolfgang Sachs (1995), one of the strongest advocates of what we today 
recognise as post-development theory states; “At a time when development has 
evidently failed as a socio-economic endeavour, it has become of paramount 
importance to liberate ourselves from its dominion over our minds” (Sachs 
1995:5). The post-development writers see the need for deconstructing the 
development discourse that, according to them, has done more harm then good. 
They are also trying to understand how the dominant discourse neglects 
alternative development patterns and pathways to development (Nustad 2004:13). 
Escobar (1995) uses the term “colonization of reality” and explains how “certain 
representations [of reality] become dominant and shape indelibly the ways in 
which reality is imagined and acted upon”. He sees how the dominant discourse 
“produces permissible modes of being and thinking while disqualifying and even 
making others impossible” (Escobar 1995:5). 
 
One of the most important post-development writers, James Ferguson, 
investigates in his book, The Anti-Politics Machine (1994), the claim that 
development does not work, and asks why development programs continue even 
though they often fail. He argues that, to understand this, we have to look at the 
effects that the development discourse produces. One of these effects is the 
depoliticizing of poverty. In an attempt to understand the social processes that 
developers are intervening in, they must make certain abstractions of reality. 
Political aspects of reality often disappear out of the analysis through the 
simplification of complexity. We then get what James Ferguson (1994) names 
The Anti-Politics Machine. Both the understanding of poverty and the 
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development intervention is depoliticized. Through a case study in Lesotho, 
Ferguson argues that: 
 
„Development‟ institutions generate their own form of discourse, and this discourse 
simultaneously constructs Lesotho as a particular kind of object of knowledge, and 
creates a structure of knowledge around that object. Interventions are then organised on 
the basis of these structures of knowledge which, while failing on their own terms, 
nonetheless have regular effects, which include the expansion and entrenchment of 
bureaucratic state power, side by side with the projection of a representation of 
economic and social life which denies „politics‟ and, to the extent that it is successful, 
suspends its effects (Ferguson 1994:xiv-xv). 
 
Development interventions thus often fail, because they ignore the highly 
political dimension they intervene within. When politics are not taken into 
account in an analysis on poverty reduction, developers are left with a limited 
description of reality. Poverty is seen as a non-political and geographically 
limited problem and phenomenon. In the case of Lesotho, the World Bank 
constructed and understood poverty in a limited national frame and described it as 
a product of unfortunate geographical circumstances and as a consequence of the 
absence of technical development. Historical and structural causes and regional 
and political circumstances were neglected in the analysis. Depoliticizing did, 
therefore, occur in the process of describing and analysing poverty and in 
determing what sort of cure was proposed (Ferguson 1994). This became clearer 
when Ferguson (2006) compared the way in which the development discourse 
represents Lesotho with the way the situation in the Bantu-state Transkei was 
interpreted. The South-African apartheid regime was trying to make the same 
anti-political manoeuvre with the Transkei as the World Bank did in the Lesotho 
case. The regime tried to separate different patterns of development in the nation 
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and saw the different “Bantu-states” as politically enclosed entities unattached to 
the rest of the South African state which, with technical assistance from the 
apartheid regime, could achieve separate development.
9
  
„In at least some respect then, the “illegitimate” and internationally despised 
“development‟ activities in Transkei and the “legitimate”, internationally 
beloved “development” initiatives in Lesotho – so different in the view from afar 
– looked a good deal alike when seen closer up” (Ferguson 2006:61). 
 
However, for the apartheid developers, the problem was that their national 
developmental construction was more visible as a construct both inside and 
outside the South African state. Politicized critique was launched from the start 
and it insisted on uncovering the simultaneity: on seeing poverty in the 
constructed Bantu-states as connected with the wealth in the urban white areas.. 
By insisting on this connection, the situation was also politicized (Ferguson 
2006:60-64). South-Africans and the ANC insisted on such a connection and 
argued that the South-African society had to be seen as one. They therefore 
deconstructed the divided society and claimed new solutions and worked toward 
the abolishing of the repressive apartheid regime (Nustad 2004:25). In the case of 
Lesotho, which Ferguson argues has to be seen as part of a regional dynamic, 
fully encapsulated geographically by South Africa, simultaneity was never 
brought into the analysis. The dominant discourse succeeded in placing their 
poverty issues inside the borders of the nation and obscuring regional connections 
(Ferguson 2006:65). 
 
                                              
9 ‟The South African planners always claimed that ”apartheid” only meant ”separate development” and that they 
where eager to help ”the Bantu” to ”develop” within their own independent ”Bantu-states‟ (Ferguson 2006:60). 
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Drawing from Knut Nustads' work on Norway and development, the term 
„temporal segregation‟ offers us a useful tool to use in our analysis. By temporal 
segregation Nustad means;  
„How an image of poor countries belonging in a separate sphere, separated from 
our selves is created. It is thereby harder to create representations of the relation 
between Norwegian wealth and others‟ poverty where causal links have been 
made between the two (Nustad 2003:46)
10
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The phenomenon „temporal segregation‟ refers to how the language of the 
development discourse disconnects poverty in the majority world from wealth in 
donor countries in the global north. As seen in Ferguson‟s Lesotho/Transkei 
comparison, wealth and poverty are seen as two separate entities in two separate 
spheres, separated both in time and space. The discursive language of 
development has the tendency to remove the causal links between the two. 
Development programmes with a focus on the transfer of money as the main 
strategy, are therefore removing and ignoring simultaneity in the analysis, the 
same process of ignoring/removing simultaneity that was criticised by the 
dependency theories. This process is characterised by a de-politicization of reality 
and development interventions and thus creates effects of power where all 
connections and relations between poverty and wealth are removed.  
4.3 Ecocracy 
How can we then understand this development critique in connection with 
environment and conservation? Many post-development writers will argue that 
                                              
10 Translated quote: Hvordan det tegnes et bilde av fattige land som tilhørende en separat sfære, atskilt fra oss selv. 
Derved blir det vanskeligere å gi fremstillinger av forholdet mellom norsk velstand og andres fattigdom hvor det ble 
etablert årsakssammenhenger mellom de to. 
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we have to expand the critique of development to the environment and the need 
for control, governance and management over it (Sachs 1992, Escobar 1995).  
 
The development agenda had, since the beginning of the post-war period, been 
fixated on economic growth as a paradigm of change. Growth is thus seen as the 
best tool with which to abolish poverty. We saw in the 1970‟s a growing concern 
about how this growth mentality both had a negative impact on poverty and also 
had a devastating impact on the environment. Many argued that the growth 
paradigm had to be broken, so that poverty issues could be solved and the 
environment spared from oil spills, deforestation, acid rain and desertification. 
The main idea and argument behind these anti-growth theories was that the 
nature was finite, and not an endless reserve of resources (Daly 1996). 
 
The international development elite did not find these perspectives viable, and 
nor did a lot of development country leaders, neither from the bio-centric 
viewpoint, nor from the humanist angle. It was not possible to convince the 
drivers of development that the exploitation of nature had to change. Concerns 
for the environment and cravings for development were therefore seen as 
completely opposite dimensions. It was not until the Brundtland Report (1987) 
and the introduction of the term “sustainable development”, that we saw an 
attempted reconciliation between these two dimensions. This meant, in practice, 
that the imperative of growth could still dominate and, as a result, ideas about 
non-growth were left out of high-level talks and practices. Wolfgang Sachs 
(1992) argues that the main concern behind this merging process was not 
grounded in an overall concern about nature or the negative impacts the growth 
paradigm had on poverty-issues. It was rather the growing concern for economic 
prospects of the future that led to this fusion. Governments all over the world 
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started to realize that the continuance of growth depended on available natural 
resources. The Brundtland Report concludes: “We have in the past been 
concerned about the impacts of economic growth upon the environment. We are 
now forced to concern ourselves with the impact of ecological stress upon our 
economic prospects” (Brundtland Report 1987).  
 
However, concerning REDD, there is another quote from this report which set the 
standard and exemplifies the continuance of what we would later know of as 
managerial discourse: “This new reality, from which there is no escape, must be 
recognized – and managed” (Brundtland Report 1987:1). Wolfgang Sachs (1992) 
argues that we are facing what he calls a new ecocracy. Ecocracy is a world order 
where so-called “eco-crats” find capital-, bureaucracy-, and science-intensive 
solutions to environmental decline. Bureaucracy in this case is not only referring 
to state bureaucracy but also to bureaucratic development interventions. In this 
world order, the industrial model of living and how it influences the environment 
is never questioned. Sachs argues that we ought to do exactly that; but instead 
every new environment challenge is met by professional bureaucratic tools and 
technology.  He sees a discourse rising in prominence, which has a fundamentally 
biased orientation:  
„it calls for extended management, but disregards intelligent self-limitation. As 
the danger mounts, new products, procedures and programmes [or initiatives?] 
are invented to stave off the threatening effects of industrialism and keep the 
system afloat” (Sachs 1992:35).  
He continues describing how the eco-cratic discourse is “unwilling to reconsider 
the logic of competitive productivism which is at the root of the planet‟s 
ecological plight”. As with the development interventions described earlier, 
targeting poverty in Lesotho, this discourse is reducing “ecology to a set of 
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managerial strategies aiming at resource efficiency and risk management. It treats 
as a technical problem what in fact amounts to no less than a civilization impasse 
– namely, that the level of productive performance already achieved turns out not 
viable in the North, let alone for the rest of the globe” (Sachs 1992:36). 
 
Sachs‟ ideas can certainly be accused of being a post-development critique taken 
to the extreme, or of being so obsessed with the ecological failure of an 
“industrial civilization” that he has become too blind to spot a possible middle 
course. It is, nevertheless, interesting to use his method of reasoning as a bridge 
between critical development theory and conservation/management. With this in 
mind, is it interesting to see how REDD fits into such a picture. Is it, for example, 
possible to argue that REDD is only a contemporary extension of this eco-cratic 
discourse, a fair attempt at finding a middle road, or a radically new way to face 
the global environment challenges? The different actors involved with REDD 
will possibly have different opinions on this, but let us first investigate an attempt 
to distinguish two opposed discourses on environment and development. 
4.4 Narratives and discourses on deforestation 
As Emery Roe (1991) explains, a development narrative often follows the 
common definition of a “story”; with a beginning, middle and an end.  The 
typical development narrative describes scenarios “about what will happen if the 
events or positions are carried out as described” (Roe 1991:288). In the form of 
an argument, they set the premises and conclusions in different developmental 
and environmental scenarios (Leach and Mearns 1996:7). Development 
narratives are thus, as Ferguson also argues, programmatic; they describe a 
problem in a certain way and prescribe thereafter its solution. The receivers are 
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then supposed to respond and act in a certain manner. According to Leach and 
Mearns (1996:8), these narratives are made on „stabilizing‟ assumptions to 
facilitate decision-making that „serve to standardize, package and label 
environmental problems so that they appear to be universally applicable and to 
justify equally standardized, off-the-shelf solutions‟. Roe (1991) emphasizes 
how, for example, rural development is an uncertain and complex activity. This is 
something earlier initiatives on deforestation have proven. Practitioners, 
bureaucrats and policy makers then use these narratives as a simplification of this 
uncertainty. By creating “broad explanatory narratives that can be operationalised 
into standard approaches with widespread applications”, uncertainties at the 
micro level are then solved (Roe 1991:288). Despite the recognising of extremely 
complex difficulties among REDD-practitioners, these difficulties are also being 
operationalised into standard development approaches.   
 
An example can be found in the influential and persistent desertification 
narrative. Swift (1996) explains how, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, an 
international consensus about desertification was created. The challenge was in 
general portrayed and explained in neo-Malthusian terms with population growth 
and inappropriate land-use as the main causes of the problem. Local herders with 
their goats were often seen as the main villains in this narrative. One scenario that 
was being claimed was how the southern Saharan edge would advance annually 
as much as 6 km. While the desertification narrative was made out of poorly 
researched ideas and was, after some years, claimed inaccurate and exaggerated, 
this almost apocalyptical scenario led to broad international action. This action 
called for more environmental management and created legitimacy for new 
control regimes over dry land resources. It is an interesting parallel here to the 
way the Brundtland Report focused on the same need for management over 
nature. Swift (1996:90) argues that „the narrative established the right of the 
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winners – national governments, aid bureaucracies and some scientists – to 
participate [in decision making] and to try to impose their view‟. The losers in 
this narrative were the rural dry land herders who lost control over important 
resources to central planning and land tenure reform. One of the interesting 
elements of this narrative is how it is being used as a programmatic tool to defend 
a certain type of intervention. The different dry land contexts are portrayed in a 
certain way using a particular narrative which fits with the planners‟, both 
national and international, desire for control and management. Not very different 
from what we saw in Fergusons (1994) Lesotho case. „[Swift] finds the 
explanation for its persistence in the fact that it serves well the interests of donor 
agencies and national governments in perpetuating various forms of planned 
development‟ (Leach and Mearns 1996:13). The question is then, whether or not 
REDD will be a new control regime over wet tropical forest areas, the same way 
that anti-desertification initiatives were over the dry land areas. The next question 
is who the winner and who the loser will be this time, in a REDD-initiative in 
which involved actors communicate that all are winners. This is further 
elaborated on in chapter 4.8. 
4.5 Managerial and populist discourse 
Different narratives about environment and development are usually part of 
broader discourses. Adger et al. (2001:683) define discourse broadly as a shared 
meaning of a phenomenon. They see discourses as different knowledge regimes. 
In these shared meanings lie certain suitable narratives that confirm a discourse. 
The discourse is produced, transformed and reproduced by actors in written text 
and oral statements. By comparing four different environmental issues, Adger et 
al. (2001) identify two clusters of main discourses: the Managerial discourse and 
the Populist discourse. It is important to know that this dichotomy is a somewhat 
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stylised version of reality, but is nevertheless a useful tool to describe and 
understand institutional practices related to development and environment. 
 
It is widely held that the managerial discourse is the dominating one in 
international politics and is characterized by a top-down, interventionist and 
technocentrist approach (Adger et al. 2001:701). This discourse is what Sachs 
(1995) calls the eco-cratic discourse. Some will also argue that, although the role 
of the state is important, a managerial discourse is in favour of embracing 
market-oriented solutions. Lorraine Elliot (1999:1) says: “International political 
responses to the globalised challenges of environmental change have been 
accommodated within and informed by neo-liberal values and modalities”. The 
REDD-initiative must, it is argued, be seen in relation to this neo-liberal feature 
of the managerial discourse.  
 
But also, what Adger et al. (2001:701) see as diametrically opposed to the 
managerial discourse, the populist discourse is important for a deeper 
understanding of the REDD-initiative. The populist discourse identifies the same 
crises but uses different narratives to explain them. The heroes, villains and 
victims in the narratives are more or less different and traditionally opposed to 
what we find in the managerial discourse (Adger et al. 2001:685). Where, in the 
managerial discourse, the local population is often seen as the primary villain 
destroying their natural surroundings with traditional slash-and-burn practices, 
these same actors are turned into victims and heroes in the populist discourse. 
This has not always been the case. In pre-1980‟s environmentalist philosophy, the 
focus was concentrated solely on flora and fauna, and „the presence of people 
tended to be seen as an obstacle to environmental preservation‟ (Conklin and 
Graham 1995:697). The shift in the 1980s towards sustainable development 
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changed this philosophy; now local forest dwellers are, at least by some NGOs 
such as RFN, seen as the key actors in reaching the goal of sustainable forest 
practices and conservation. Indigenous people are, by the populist discourse, seen 
as the number one forest caretakers in these discourses and must therefore be 
targeted and given rights to claim their land. According to Conklin and Graham, 
(1995:696) this philosophy can be traced back to the old idea of “the noble 
savage”, which was prominent in the writings of old European philosophers such 
as Rousseau and Montaigne. Native cultures were idealised as living in harmony 
with nature and were seen as a contrast to the modern ideas of the European 
destructive materialism. They argue that Western environmentalists today have 
created a similar ideal, where ecology is distinctly emphasised. „Native peoples in 
general, and Native Americans in particular, came to be widely viewed as 
“natural conservationists” who use environmental resources in ways that are non-
destructive, sustainable and mindful of effects of future generations‟ We can find 
such organisations as RFN as strong advocators of such ideas. Their focus on 
indigenous rights in their anti-deforestation work has to be seen as part of the 
populist discourse. Indigenous people were also formerly seen as irrelevant, and 
left out of the dominating development discourse, but this aforementioned shift, 
towards sustainable development and sustainable management practices, led to an 
incorporation of the indigenous population in the development discourse as well 
as in the environmentalist/populist discourse. Yet, as many anthropologists, 
historians and some native leaders have noted, there are no guarantees that the 
„Native Americans‟ relations to nature are equivalent to Western 
environmentalist principles‟ (Conklin and Graham 1995:697-698).  
 
The main conclusion drawn by Adger et al. (2001:709) was that both discourses 
simplify reality and that there are striking discrepancies between the discursive 
simplifications and the diversity of situations in local context. They link this 
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production of simplifications to what Scott (1998) sees as a „project of legibility‟. 
That is, how states have always worked out, through more and more advanced 
methods of simplification and standardization, ways to make their population, 
nature and space legible. Through in-depth descriptions of urban planning in 
post-mediaeval Europe, the state creation of surnames in the Philippines under 
the Spanish and the imposition of a standard language in France, he explains how 
state modernisation projects also implicate the need for increased control and the 
creation of a legible people (Scott 1998).  
 
State projects are still in need of such a control through simplifications, but so too 
are development interventions, conservation organisations and rainforest 
initiatives. It is therefore interesting to see how these dynamics unfold in the 
REDD-initiative. Adger et al. (2001:709) points to the shortcomings of 
managerial and populist discourses when it comes to understanding problems and 
solutions to environmental challenges. Like the dominant development discourse, 
they create narratives that fit their discourse and their solution to the problem. 
They also, to some extent, leave out alternative causal explanations to problems, 
whether it is deforestation, desertification or other environmental challenges 
(Ferguson 1994). They then create what Büscher and Dressler (2007), while 
describing the consensus in the development/conservation discourse, see as „a 
layer of discursive blur‟ which obscures the gap between reality and rhetoric. 
 
Both the managerial discourse and the populist discourse are visible in the 
REDD-initiative, and perhaps especially if we focus on Norway, where RFN has 
been a central actor. The Norwegian altruistic aid philosophy can also, however, 
be seen as part of both discourses. It is therefore interesting to take a closer look 
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into the case of Norway and see how the Norwegian REDD-narrative is 
constructed and how the two different discourses are visible. 
4.6 Commodification of nature (Neoliberal conservation) 
The dominating idea of recognising the market value of different aspects of 
nature and ecological services is part of what we know as commoditisation of 
nature. In REDD, government, companies or communities will be rewarded 
financially for not cutting down their forests. A value has to be put on standing  
trees to create an economic incentive for not cutting them down. This is the key 
message from REDD-actors such as, for example, Jens Soltenberg. Also, the 
possible opening for an inclusion of REDD in a future carbon market makes this 
especially important to explore. Escobar (1995) explains how processes of 
commodifying nature have been connected especially to a rising discourse of 
biodiversity. Viewing the forest as a potential carbon sink is now included in this 
process. Escobar explains how “species of flora and fauna are valuable not as 
much as resources but as reservoirs of value that research and knowledge, along 
with biotechnology, can release for capital and communities” (Escobar 
1995:203). He sees this as the reason why tropical forest dwellers have finally 
been recognised as rightful owners of their territory, “but only to the extent that 
they accept to treat it – and themselves – as reservoirs of capital” (Escobar 
1995:203). The local forest people are then seen as stewards of the social and 
natural capital working on behalf of the world economy.  There are two 
arguments that are crucial in this. Firstly, to acknowledge how nature, through 
different biodiversity and climate initiatives, is being more and more 
commodified. And secondly, how this process of commodification is 
encapsulating and concealing causal links inside the apparently neutral idea of 
commodities. These commodities are in turn traded on the international market 
and other aspects of this and other tropical forest transactions become blurred. 
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Deforestation, connected causally to a global capitalist production of 
commodities, is thus obscured in this process of commodification. Anna Tsing 
(2005:51) argues that we have to look closer at the international chain of 
commodities that, manifested as the end product, have no traces of the friction 
created from the journey from raw material to the object of consumers‟ desire. 
This friction can be manifest in different ways: awkward, unequal, unstable and 
creative processes appearing at different global encounters. It can be both good 
and bad, but the main idea behind her work is that these chains of production are 
not a smooth operating machine, but a process of friction.  
 
Processes of commodification are closely linked to processes of neoliberalisation. 
Neoliberalism is seen by many as a dominating concept in the world today 
(Harvey 2005). Neoliberalisation can be explained as a bundle of global 
processes, varying from location to location, but always revolving around a core 
idea that market solutions are better than state-based solutions. Privatisation, 
marketisation, market-based solutions in the public sector (New Public 
Management) and state-led transitions of services from state to civil society are 
examples of such neoliberalisation processes (Castree 2007:142). Deregulation 
and privatisation are often seen as the ultimate goal of neoliberal policies (Igoe 
and Brockington 2007). Neoliberalism can also be explained as “ the 
financialization of everything and the reallocation of the power centre of capital 
accumulation to owners and their financial institutions at the expense of other 
factions of capital” (Harvey 2006:24) But Neoliberalism has not made the state 
and its institutions irrelevant, and the dichotomy state-market can therefore be 
argued as being a simplification. It is more a matter of the emergence of a neo-
liberal state which has a fundamental mission in creating a good business climate. 
The neo-liberal state therefore functions as a facilitator of business interest and is 
always looking for new fields of capital accumulation (Harvey 2006:25).  
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In REDD, trees and carbon are – through a neoliberal discourse - treated as 
purely technical objects that can be measured, validated and may also be traded in 
future carbon markets. The rainforest becomes something technical and 
quantifiable, with no history, no political implications and no power relations 
attached to it. The encapsulations of these dimensions inside entities such as trees 
and carbon are recognisably the same as the process of power effects that are 
described in the post-development literature. It is therefore interesting to see what 
sort of causal links are not taken into the discussions about REDD. REDD is also 
dependent on a detailed control system which is based on using advanced 
technology and satellites in orbit in space. Satellites will monitor countries‟ and 
local communities‟ forest activities. This monitoring is the security mechanism 
that shall secure the performance-based system where money is only transferred 
after deforestation measures are proven successful. Some would label these 
methods as typical examples of neoliberal management techniques, which in 
REDD, have new and, some would argue, extreme dimensions in terms of 
satellites. 
 
Development thinking and planning has also been accused of being dominated by 
neoliberal ideas. The emergence of the so-called Washington Consensus, which 
according to some is dominating in multilateral institutions such as IMF and the 
World Bank, has created a strong belief in market-based solutions as the best way 
to achieve development. This, in turn, means that the state should withdraw from 
development programmes and let the market take over such processes. This 
method of reasoning was part of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP), 
which have, since the 1980s, been implemented in the global south by IMF and 
the World Bank to reduce poverty. Loans from these institutions are granted on 
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conditions that favour the market and diminish the role of the state
11
. These 
programmes were supposed to stabilize fragile economies and spur economic 
growth through the devaluation of currencies, the deregulation of markets, 
reduced bureaucracies and the privatization of state industries and services. In 
Africa the result was, instead of prosperity and growth, the lowest rate of growth 
recorded and increased marginalisation and inequality between people (Ferguson 
2006:11). 
 
Considering global neoliberalism and the varying processes of neoliberalisation, 
would it perhaps be natural to look at neoliberal conservation as an oxymoron? 
At first glance, neoliberal ideas and conservation efforts would appear to be in 
opposition to each other. This has also been the common way to understand 
conservation, as a bulwark against neoliberal free-market capitalism, protecting 
the environment and its natural ecosystems (Igoe and Brockington 2007). 
However, some researchers have tried to challenge this dichotomy. They see a 
connection between neoliberal ideas and biodiversity conservation efforts and 
argue that „neoliberalisation involves the reregulation of nature through forms of 
commoditization. This, in turn, entails new types of territorialisation: the 
partitioning of resources and landscapes in ways that control, and often exclude, 
local people‟(Igoe and Brockington 2007:432). These forms of territorialisation 
are a reregulation of nature, „which frequently creates new types of values and 
make those values available to national and transnational elites‟ (Igoe and 
Brockington 2007:432). Conservation must therefore not be seen as being 
opposed to neoliberalism, but more as a neoliberal need for control over nature 
that needs to be explained. According to Büscher (2010) it is conservation and 
                                              
11 SAP has been heavily criticised and has been replaced by Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). Some 
would still argue that this is just a new name for the same policies that were dominating in SAP. 
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development interventions regulated through a wider, neoliberal political 
economy, which fuels and obscures (global) inequality. McAfee (1999:5) argues 
that  
„at the heart of the global environmental-economic paradigm is the neoclassical 
ideal of the world as a vast marketplace, in which all human-nature interactions, 
(…) can be understood as market-type exchanges‟. The optimal goal is then to 
recognise nature in monetary-terms, „from molecules to mountainscapes, from 
human tissue to the earth atmosphere‟ (McAfee 1999:2).  
This also includes the realms of the world‟s tropical rainforests. This post-
structural way of understanding conservation has to be seen in parallel with the 
previous described neoliberal ideas of the managerial discourse and the critical 
development approach. It is also important to be aware of this connection when 
REDD is now becoming a number one framework for global conservation efforts. 
4.7 The rhetoric of win-win-win 
Biodiversity and growth are part of the conservation language. The fight against 
climate change has now added carbon storage to this win-win scenario. The 
Norwegian REDD-initiative aim is that „reducing deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD) can produce a triple dividend – gains for the climate, for 
biodiversity and for sustainable development‟.   
 
Liza Grandia (2009:487) writes about the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor 
(MBC) – a World Bank multi-million dollar project promoting both”conservation 
and sustainable development in a region with high rates of biological endemism 
as well as seemingly endemic poverty” (Grandia 2009:479). She describes how 
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the central MBC-planners
12
 see markets as not only being able to solve 
„development problems, but simultaneously to achieve environmental goals and 
inspire democratization‟. A quote from the Minister of Environment in Honduras 
set the standard, “[MBC] has the objective of improving business opportunities 
and living standards, as well as conserving biodiversity and the quality of 
environmental services” (Honduras This Week, online 7/17/2000 in Grandia 
2009:487). Grandia points out that we now have not only classical win-win 
scenarios but „can now have “win-win-win-win-win-win-win” equations that 
benefit alike corporate investors, national economies, biodiversity, local people, 
western consumers, not to mention the World Bank and the big international 
NGOs (BINGOs).” We can now, in these REDD-dominating times add carbon 
storage to this equation and observe how REDD is also planned to benefit all 
involved actors. 
 
The MBC-project has some interesting features that can also indicate some of the 
potential pitfalls of the REDD-initiative. Firstly, you have a huge conservation 
initiative with a lot of political willingness between a multitude of actors and the 
potential allocation of lots of well-distributed resources. Secondly, the rhetorical 
language of the project is strikingly similar to the one used in REDD-strategies; 
sustainable development and participation joined with a „Bolivarian‟ concern for 
the poor. Thirdly, you find a colluding alliance between the Bank and 
conservation BINGO‟s13 which absorbs most of the non-governmental resources. 
This prevents „a broader vision of environmental justice that a mosaic approach 
to corridor conservation could otherwise have inspired‟ (Grandia 2007:497). 
                                              
12 Grandia (2007:497) realized that the World Bank is a „many-headed hydra‟ and recognises that there are those 
within the Bank who try to reform it. She nevertheless finds it true that the main MBC-architects are not diverging 
from the bureaucratic „business as usual‟ approach.  
13 BINGO (Big International Non-Governmental Organisations). 
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According to Grandia (2007), the neoliberal economic development goals were 
dominating in the MBC-performances, and long-term goals of biodiversity 
conservation were reduced. The outcome was then a „biological corridor clearly 
aligned with other regional plans for neoliberal economic development and trade‟ 
(Grandia 2007:497).  
 
It is important to point to these similarities between the REDD-initiative and the 
MBC-corridor. They are part of a trend, which can be described more as 
neoliberal environmentalism, reregulation, marketisation and commoditisation of 
nature, than what the REDD/MBC-rhetoric describes as participation, win-win-
win scenarios, bottom-up approaches and pro-poor sustainable and indigenous 
development. There is a gap here between rhetoric and reality and the reason may 
be that REDD both can be seen as managerial top-down and populist bottom-up. 
As Nils Hermann Ranum from RFN explains, he thinks that REDD will adhere to 
both bottom-up and top-down principles. He somehow contradictorily says that it 
is clear that a REDD-framework never will be bottom-up, but that this will not 
work “if you do not incorporate the perspectives of the people living in the 
remotest areas of the forest”. In both the MBC project and in the REDD-initiative 
lies the same idea about how the two initiatives are supposed to benefit all 
involved actors alike. This, in turn, is related to the so-called „mobilizing 
metaphors‟, such as participation, ownership, capacity building and good 
governance ( Büscher 2010:29). Mosse (2004:663) argues that the vagueness, 
ambiguity and lack of conceptual precision in these metaphors “is required to 
conceal ideological differences [and] to allow enrolment of different interests”.  
These mobilizing metaphors are often used in the Norwegian discussions on 
REDD, and in my interviews with my informants. It is therefore interesting to see 
how Norway, with the REDD-initiative, enters into a post-development hornet‟s 
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nest where conservation is seen as one of the ultimate negative manifestations of 
the development machine. 
4.8 Summary 
I have, in this theory chapter, wanted to reflect critically upon how both 
development and environment initiatives are constructed around the idea that 
both poverty issues and environmental issues can be solved through instrumental 
and technical interventions. The dominant development discourse thus favours a 
managerial approach to nature, where the environment is controlled and 
governed. As such, REDD can be seen as an extension of this need for control on 
a global scale. In this understanding, REDD is then a global version of this 
technical solution. What complicates this is that REDD is interpreted, and can 
end up, as many different things. This is why the dichotomy put forward by 
Adger et al. (2001) is too simple for understanding this new 
environmental/developmental phenomenon. The REDD-initiative contains traces 
of both the managerial and populist discourses, at least rhetorically. My argument 
is still that despite these traces of both discourses, there are some strong 
indications that REDD has to be interpreted primarily as a grand top-down 
initiative where a dominant climate elite are creating programmes neither to 
change the system that produces poverty and environment degradation, nor to 
change the consumption patterns and climatic footprints of the Global North. The 
programmes are instead created to target the population less integrated into the 
global economy and change their behavioural patterns, whether these are 
subsistence farmers or rural forest dwellers in, say, Sulawesi. It is not certain that 
this is the best solution for the environment or for substantially reduced poverty 
rates. My argument which follows is that a huge initiative such as REDD and the 
rhetoric used in relation to this can instead obscure important causal links 
between both poverty and environmental issues. Through such initiatives, they 
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are, as a result, in danger of both targeting the wrong people and obscuring other 
and more fundamental causal links behind deforestation and climate change. It is 
important to emphasise here that this is only one possible dimension of a future 
REDD-regime. I still believe that it is important to realize that there is an under-
communicated dimension of REDD that is reminiscent of more old-fashioned aid 
and is even more top-down and money driven than usual. No matter what a 
REDD system will look like in the end, it will be in need of strong monitoring 
and data control. If REDD, as many people intend, later becomes connected to a 
future carbon market, this will give it an even stronger neoliberal twist, a more 
explicit  commodification of nature creating a stronger need for a detailed control 
system.  
 
Through an analysis of successful anti-deforestation activism in Kalimantan in 
the 1980´s, Tsing (2005) discovered that the cooperation between different actors 
- in this case forest dwellers, provincial nature lovers and national environmental 
activists - was based on systematic misunderstandings. The interesting element of 
this is how these misunderstandings “– far from producing conflict – had allowed 
them to work together!” (Tsing 2005). Tsing observed that the social 
mobilization against deforestation is “based on negotiating more or less 
recognized differences in the goals, objects and strategies of the cause” (2005). Is 
it possible to find parallels of these dynamics in the international or Norwegian 
politics of climate change? Can we find similar systematic and constructive 
misunderstandings or discrepancies in goals, objects and strategies? Or are the 
different actors all neglecting one or more „elephants in the room‟? REDD‟s 
paradox lies in its flexibility and rigidity. At one level every actor, despite huge 
differences, understands REDD as something that fits their agendas and aims. On 
the other hand, REDD is also a fixed initiative dominated by the idea that 
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increased value on preserved forest is the number one solution to deforestation 
and degradation problems.  
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5. Critical approaches to Norwegian climate and 
development policy 
”If everyone else had done the same as Norway, the world would have taken a 
significant step forward” 14 
Erik Solheim, December 2009
15
. 
In an interview prior to the COP 15 in Copenhagen, the Norwegian Minister of 
Environment and International Development, Erik Solheim, is very confident. 
When confronted with the oil paradox - that he represents one of the biggest oil 
producing countries in the world and still can feel confident to claim Norway a 
climate champion, Solheim replies that he sees the paradox but that, compared to 
the rest of the world, no other country is better than Norway in terms of 
environmental issues. „If everyone else had done the same as Norway, the world 
would have taken a significant step forward‟. He adds that he, as the Norwegian 
Minister of Environment and International Development, is more or less 
internationally celebrated, but this ends when he arrives at Svinesund: “Then I 
only get yelled at”, he says and smiles. Erik Solheim was rewarded the UN 
Champion of the Earth prize in 2009 for his political leadership
16
. This may stand 
as a symbol of how he is internationally celebrated. 
 
                                              
14 Original quote: ”Hvis alle andre hadde gjort som Norge ville verden ha beveget seg et vesentlig skritt videre” 
15 In: Bergens Tidende, 3 December 2009. 
16 A prize that in 2010 was awarded to Bharrat Jagdeo,.the president of another important REDD-country, Guyana. 
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5.1 “Norway” presented 
„Through Norwegian statements on foreign policy and practices, a self-image is 
created and continued. This is done primarily for the Norwegian population, but 
is also aimed at the countries Norway interacts with and who observe Norwegian 
action‟17 (Leira et al. 2007:9) . 
 In the above statement by Solheim lies a deeply rooted understanding of Norway. 
Norway is often portrayed in contradiction with its geographical, economical, 
political and historical context. A report on power and democracy, that was 
carried out in an assignment by the Norwegian Parliament in the 1998-2003 
period, emphasizes how “«Norway» since the early 1990‟s has been built up as an 
international brand, as a special peace-loving and donor-friendly country with 
special tasks in the world community” (NOU 2003). This labeling and identity 
production of «Norway» is achieved by the so-called “engagement policy” which 
has dominated the post-cold war epoch in Norway. Norway was in this period 
declared World Champion of development aid, as the best emergency aid nation 
and as a humanitarian superpower by Norwegian political leaders. All this 
happened without a lot of discussion and with enthusiastic support from the civil 
society, academia and press (Tvedt 2009). The question is then whether the 
Norwegian REDD-initiative is a continuance of this tradition.  
 
This policy implies international interventions such as aid, peace keeping and 
negotiations and promotion of democracy and human rights. This labeling 
process has been perpetuated by various Norwegian governments. It manifests 
itself in our role as negotiators in the Middle East, Sri Lanka, Darfur, and the 
donation of the world‟s highest amount of per capita rates of aid to developing 
                                              
17 My own English translation. 
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countries. The idea of the Norwegian engagement policy - or Norway as an 
important actor in the global landscape promoting peace and social justice - is 
based on the impression of the country being placed in a unique historical 
situation. Chapter 12 in the Report on Power and Democracy continues with a 
description on the comparative advantages of Norway:  
“Norway‟s advantage in international politics was utilized – it is a small country 
without a colonial past in a peaceful corner of the world. It would be more 
difficult for a country with a more significant ability and tradition of power 
politics to have idealism as a trademark. This was the foundation for the image 
of Norway as a «humanitarian superpower» (NOU 2003:19, 12.1)
18
. 
 
The fact that Norway is a small country with no colonial heritage or past has been 
communicated as one of Norway‟s advantages in international engagement 
policy. Some consider the 400 years under the Danish crown as a colonial 
relationship and we can therefore claim our own historical uniqueness – Norway 
colonized by our Danish neighbors. This creates a myth about Norway as a 
European exception, the land of difference, removed from our factual political, 
economic and historical context. Once again, the Norwegian identity and political 
rhetoric are constructed around a limited understanding of Norway in the world. 
This is reminiscent of Ferguson‟s argument, discussed above, that Lesotho was 
constructed as a country divorced from its historical, economical and regional 
context. But in the case of Norway it is not the World Bank but Norway itself that 
is responsible for the ascribed identity. This self-ascribed identity can be 
understood as Norway‟s postcolonial identity (NOU 2003:19, 12).  
 
                                              
18 My own English translation. 
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This postcolonial identity is visible through what Nina Witoszek (2010) describes 
as a chorus of lyrical self-promotion. Quotes such as: Norway “is small … way 
up here and we have no colonial past” (Vidar Helgesen), “we are not Americans 
and we are not Europeans, we are just ourselves” (Morten Utgaard) and “our 
reputation is impeccable” (Janne Matlary)19 confirm this myth. Many such 
quotations are found about the uniqueness and the comparative advantages of 
Norway, both in academic literature, political programs and the media. The 
population in Norway considers the country as a humanitarian nation and takes its 
unique historical background as a fact. The historical background is then used as 
proof of how Norway operates in, for example, the field of development, solely 
on good altruistic intentions – the good Norwegian Samaritan20 working for a 
global good. 
5.2 A different Norway presented 
The image of Norway described above presents Norway as a remarkable actor in 
the international landscape of politics and development: Norway is in a unique 
mid-position. Not a former colonizer but rather colonized. Norway is a small 
country but still in the position to make a difference in the world. Some will, 
however, point out that this is a somewhat confusing image of Norway. Some 
would also say that it is completely wrong and misleading and that a 
disconnection of Norway from their real historical roots and geography would be 
a mistake.  
 
                                              
19 All quotations found in: Witoszek, Nina (2010): ”Development as Dystopia”. Development Today, 4-5 2010.  
20 The Norwegian Samaritan is used in Terje Tvedts‟ work on the Norwegian development system. See for example: 
Tvedt (2009:20-22) 
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It is, for instance, important to see that Norway as a European country has a 
colonial history. As a member of the NATO it has a history of anti-communism. 
As a capitalist country it has a history of accumulation (Neumann 2003:7). I 
would also add that there also exists a tremendous history of consumerism and an 
expanding ecological footprint. The fact that Norway is part of the rich fifth of 
the world‟s population that represents 80% of world consumption therefore has to 
be recognized. Norway also has a history of oppression towards minorities such 
as the Sámi and the Finns (Gullestad 2005:41).  
 
Norway is one of the few non-colonial countries that increased its land area 
considerably under the last colonial period. Svalbard and the Bouvet-sector in the 
South Atlantic Ocean became Norwegian administrative areas in 1923 and 1939. 
The fact that these areas were not inhabited could be why this is not considered as 
colonialism . A Norwegian proposal at the peace negotiations at Versailles, 1919, 
could have changed this image. The minister Wedel Jarlsberg wanted Germany to 
give one of their African colonies to Norway as a compensation for lost tonnage 
during World War I (Kjærland and Rio 2009:6). Kjærland and Rio (2009) think 
that there are reasons for believing that Jarlsberg was probably interested in the 
German colony Tanganyika. Another fact often ignored is that the Norwegian 
government managed to increase its territory on the continental shelf 
considerably in the 1970‟s (Gullestad 2005:43). Thus, it ended up controlling a 
vast area of the coast, full of oil, gas and fish resources. All these examples point 
to an alternative view of Norwegian history where Norway is deeply rooted in the 
political realms of the global North. These realms are, among other things, 
characterized by historical domination of other parts of the world, expansive 
corporations, mass consumption and a high ecological footprint. On top of all 
this, Norway is an important oil and gas producer and net-exporter. This makes it 
especially hard for Norway to be a trustworthy actor in international climate 
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politics. They nevertheless manage to be one. By focusing on REDD, this 
schizophrenic process may be revealed. 
5.3 The Norwegian regime of goodness 
As mentioned above, Terje Tvedt is one of the most influential academic critics 
of the Norwegian development policy and cooperation. He won the Freedom of 
Expression Prize in 2007 for his examination of the Norwegian development 
cooperation, peace policies and the close connection between NGOs, research 
institutions, the political community and the Norwegian State
21
. One of Tvedts' 
main arguments is that we have to look behind what he sees as a discursive 
domination where dogmas and morality dominate. This discursive domination is 
not directly visible but veiled behind the notion and idea about “the good (noble) 
project”. This project is an abstraction and a myth, says Tvedt. This myth projects 
Norway as a development aid power and peace broker and places this political 
field outside other political and social contexts (Tvedt 2009:11). In general, he 
argues, this political field is characterized by a wall of conventionalism, moral-
ideological unassailability, national ritual self-affirmation and a system hidden 
behind conceptual, representational and moral power. Tvedt therefore sees the 
need to undress the Norwegian Samaritan as a power figure and understand the 
claimed hero of the nation in the age of globalization: the noble man in his fight 
on behalf of the World‟s poor (Tvedt 2009:12).  
 
It is striking to see the enormous ambitions about development and poverty 
reduction in Norway. Tvedt (2009) uses an interview
22
 with former Prime 
                                              
21 http://www.fritt-ord.no/en/priser/category/fritt_ords_pris/ 
22 Dagbladet 4th of February 2008, 
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Minister, Kjell Magne Bondevik, to illustrate this. It said in the article that he had 
recently saved the lives of 80 million people on the African Horn. He had done 
this as a UN-envoy in the area. Tvedt says that if the story had been true this 
would have been a fantastic feat, 80 million people are more then any famine we 
have seen before in Africa. It would have made our former Prime Minister 
immortal. But the article had no connection with reality whatsoever. Dagbladet 
wrote about a famine that never existed and a fantastic aid operation that had 
never occurred (Tvedt 2009:317-318). What is interesting with this incident is not 
only the fact that one of the biggest newspapers in Norway wrote about 
something that never happened, but the way in which all this is described, says 
Tvedt. It is described, not as something exceptional and impressive; it is 
presented as something quite normal and ordinary. The reaction to the fact that 
Bondevik had probably saved 80 million people, was nothing more than a shrug. 
It is seen as quite normal that Norwegian politicians save millions of African 
lives. This can be seen as sign of how domestic politics is seen as complicated 
and almost unchangeable for one man or woman, but that same person can go to 
Africa, or other far away places, as an individual or with donor money or REDD 
funding, and save millions of lives or millions of square meters of tropical forest. 
The implications and complexities in these different initiatives are not discussed, 
nor is the power relation attached to the same processes. Our action is based on 
the apolitical intervention where we can only do good - as one of my informants 
told me; “I‟m quite sure that we at least do not do any harm with this initiative 
[REDD]”. But what if REDD ends up as a failed initiative which did more harm 
than good? What if Norway ends up as the most important facilitator for a project 
that will favor the huge corporate interest more than it favors the local poor 
population, “the poorest of the poor” who are, as one informant put it, those who 
are pushed forward as the real target group in REDD rhetoric? Have these people 
been asked about this initiative? Do they want it? And will the money reach these 
people at any stage in the process? The answers are very far from clear. 
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Examples such as these are important for revealing aspects of how the world is 
understood in the Norwegian political setting. Very rarely are complexities 
discussed and we often find examples on how Norwegian initiatives in the global 
South are seen as easy and uncomplicated involvements where swift change can 
be achieved. This can be linked to how my different informants all refer to REDD 
as a more politically realistic alternative compared to other climate measures. It is 
striking how the idea of political realism is influenced by those whose lives you 
will affect with the change you want to make. The different self-images of 
Norway have in common that they mainly lead to practice some distance away 
from a Norwegian neighbourhood (Leira et al. 2007:23). To create change in 
these “far-away-places” is, from Norwegian policy maker‟s standpoint, much 
easier than to make substantial and sustainable change in the Norwegian society. 
This is visible if you look at how different Norwegian governments and 
parliaments have related their decisions about development policies compared to 
disputes about domestic issues. Tvedt (2009) notes how the Norwegian 
Parliament historically has several times unanimously voted for development 
strategies that are made valid for all developing countries. In one illustrating 
example from 1984/1985 all political parties voted unanimously for one joint 
strategy for all developing countries. A strategy they argued was based on 
historical experience. At the same time, the same political parties were arguing 
about everything else and the Willoch-government had to leave office because of 
a disagreement on increasing gasoline prices. “At the same time the same 
politicians in parliament decided upon one joint development strategy for more 
then 100 countries more than half of the earth‟s population” (Tvedt 2009:183)23. 
This example shows a simple but important truth about politics in general; The 
                                              
23 My own english translation. 
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World is complex at home, and simple and uncomplicated abroad the further you 
go from your own political parochialism. In this parochialism it is therefore 
convenient to move your own political issues out of the “complex” Norwegian 
context and to “simple” far-away places. In that sense, the tropical rainforest may 
be one of the most remote places you can go and that‟s where Norway is heading 
right now. The phenomenon of moving Norway‟s own political issues out of the 
Norwegian context is not new. The origin of Norwegian development aid was, 
for instance, rooted in an internal conflict in a divided Labour Party in the 
beginning of the 1950s. The Norwegian membership in NATO and the Korean 
War was heavily disputed in Norway. A big development initiative in Kerala, 
India, therefore had a unifying effect both internally in the party but also in the 
rest of the population (Simensen 2003:42-44).  
5.4 The Norwegian paradoxes 
There are some paradoxes related to Norway as a global actor. Norwegian foreign 
policy carries some important tensions and contradictions (Leira et. al 2007:5). 
These paradoxes are rarely talked about and Norway has in many ways been 
immune to criticism (Tvedt 2009). A report launched on behalf of the Forum for 
Development and Environment emphasizes some of these paradoxes (Curtis 
2010). Norway is, for example, through the government‟s Pension Fund, 
investing in companies abusing human rights and the environment. Norwegian 
state-owned companies are also involved internationally in similar abuses. 
Norway is, through its oil industry, responsible for huge amounts of CO2 
emissions and is also a strong influential energy actor in states that can be 
accused for being corrupt, undemocratic and also abusive of human rights 
Azerbaijan, Algeria, Angola, Iran and Nigeria are all examples of states with 
Norwegian energy involvement (Curtis 2010:9).. Norway has also, at the same 
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time as building a reputation as a crucial peace broker, been the world‟s 20th 
largest arms exporter over the last thirty years. Norway has also been criticising 
the World Bank and IMF for imposing privatization and deregulation on 
developing countries, but is at the same time promoting privatization in other 
processes, for example when it benefits Norwegian energy companies. These are 
some examples of what Curtis sees as a Norwegian doublethink and the two faces 
of Norwegian development and environmental policies (Curtis 2010). I will argue 
that these paradoxes are especially strong since Norway has established such a 
strong impression and identity nationally and internationally as a genuine 
altruistic promoter of peace and development. It is also possible to argue that the 
altruistic identity has created a better image of Norway. Lodgaard (2002:206) 
argues that Norway needs to be a large aid donor and peace builder in order to 
maintain and enhance a positive image internationally. If these two dimensions of 
Norwegian foreign policy were absent, a more egoistical image of Norway would 
appear, says Lodgaard (2002:206). Development aid is often introduced in 
settings where Norwegian involvement can otherwise only be interpreted as 
negative. This can be argued whether we talk about oil and gas, the arms trade, or 
climate issues. The fact that the development agenda is often overemphasized 
only sharpens the paradoxes and makes them even more paradoxical. Norway 
has, in addition, also gained a lot of success in this positive national branding. 
This success has made Norway a more prominent international actor in different 
arenas. With regard to REDD, the Norwegian engagement has placed Norway in 
a position as a founder. Audun Rosland, the Norwegian forest negotiator, says, 
for example, that the Norwegian REDD-money has given Norway credibility in 
the climate negotiations. “It is obvious that this promise has made us the most 
important industrialized country that has the greatest influence on the 
negotiations”24. The current Norwegian Prime Minister, Jens Stoltenberg, was, 
                                              
24 Quoted in Aftenposten 26.11.2009. 
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together with Gordon Brown (UK), Meles Zenawi (Ethiopia) and Bharrat Jagdeo 
(Guyana) appointed as a member of a UN high-level advisory group of the UN-
Secretary General on climate change financing in March 2010. The Norwegian 
REDD initiative has thus created a room where Norway can play a more active 
role in international climate negotiations.  
According to Lodgaard (2002) the Norwegian focus on development aid is not 
only an act of altruism, but also a matter of a nation‟s own interest. REDD is in 
this respect gaining influence and prestige for Norway and Norwegian politicians 
and climate negotiators at the international climate arena. Norway is also in 
general gaining a lot of positive feedback from the international political 
environment because of this REDD-initiative. It is therefore an important part of 
the green and altruistic Norwegian self-image – a continuance of what Lodgaard 
(2002) points to.  
 
Mark Curtis (2010) concludes quite interestingly that despite Norway‟s ethical 
lead on some issues, the unethical list also long and becoming longer. He writes;  
“The leitmotif in Norway‟s unethical behaviour concerns the promotion of 
business interests and the failure to restrain and direct them towards promoting 
human rights. In this respect, Norway has become little different to other rich 
countries exploiting the planet for their own benefit”.  
Curtis thereby states that Norway has lost its ethical niche. He places Norway 
where he says they actually belong: as part of the dominant elite among the 
world‟s nations. Norway cannot claim their supposed and constructed differences 
any more. The only thing that is different is that Norway pretends to be 
something other than the countries it would be natural to compare themselves 
with. 
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What happens after such a straightforward critique and unveiling of the 
Norwegian paradox? In Norway this sort of fundamental critique, which explores 
issues outside the dominant discursive blur, is most often only met with silence. 
The report did not make the front pages and spurred no public debate. The 
government and the whole southern political system met the report conclusions 
with the most effective tool: they kept quiet. Nina Witoszek (2010) argues that it 
is shocking how this unmasking of Norway‟s two faces disappeared into nothing 
substantially new. She writes:  
“As we move forward in the 21st century, the Norwegian government and most 
NGOs have become so entrenched in their “goodness” that they are immune to 
criticism. Nor do they need intellectuals. The government commissions - and 
tolerates - critical research not to correct its policy, but to demonstrate to itself its 
imperial goodness”. 
 
The same trend is visible if you look at the Norwegian debate on REDD. The 
goodness in the initiative masks the paradoxical realities, naivety and enormous 
difficulties that are entrenched in it. The same dynamic is also visible there; the 
NGOs are part of the system and are in no need of either a public debate nor 
critical intellectuals or researchers.  
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6. The Norwegian REDD-initiative 
“The technology is well known and has been available for thousands of years. 
Everybody knows how not to cut down a tree” 
Jens Stoltenberg, Bali 2007
25
   
The now almost legendary comment by Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg at the 
UNFCCC COP 15 in Bali, Indonesia, was part of the speech where Norway 
announced their historical ambitions on reducing CO2-emissions from 
deforestation. The core of the Norwegian ambitions is found in this quote: All we 
need to do is to pay people not to cut down trees.  
6.1 The political situation in Norway 
After the election on 12 September 2005, the Stoltenberg II government was 
appointed. The Stoltenberg Second Cabinet was the first majority government 
appointed in Norway in twenty years and included the Centre Party, the Labour 
Party and the Socialist Left Party. It is thus considered as a centre-left 
government and given the name the Red-Green Coalition. The coalition was re-
elected in 2009. The cabinet is dominated by the Labour Party, which now holds 
64 out of 169 seats in the parliament and have 12 out of 20 ministers in the new 
cabinet. The socialist left lost four seats in the parliament after the 2009 election 
and are now equal with the Centre Party. They both hold 11 seats in the 
parliament and have four ministers in the cabinet. The Socialist Left Party has 
thus lost significant negotiating power since the former period when the 
                                              
25 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/smk/aktuelt/taler_og_artikler/statsministeren/statsminister_jens_stoltenberg/2007-
4/Tale-til-FNs-klimakonferanse-pa-Bali.html?id=493899 
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Norwegian REDD-initiative was initiated. The opposition in the parliament 
consists of the Progress Party, the Conservative Party, the Christian Democratic 
Party and the Liberal Party. 
 
The Socialist Left Party has been an important part of the policies related to 
climate and development issues. They still have the Minister of Environment and 
International Development, Erik Solheim, and have put environmental issues 
high on their agendas for many years. As we will see later on in this chapter, the 
support from the Socialist Left Party was important for the creation of a REDD-
initiative. The Labour Party is in general more reluctant when it comes to climate 
efforts. They are concerned about the potential conflict between employment and 
climate efforts, especially related to the extractive industries offshore and its 
influence on the whole Norwegian economy. This potential conflict is part of the 
Norwegian paradoxes.  
6.2 The REDD process in Norway 
6.2.1 2007 – The climate threat is rediscovered 
To understand why the Norwegian climate and forest initiative came about, we 
have to go back to 2007 when climate once again was on everyone‟s lips. And it 
was not only the late indian summer of 2006 that changed, at least temporarily, 
the public opinion and debate in Norway and elsewhere. Global climate change 
has been an important issue and on the agenda for more than twenty years, but the 
debate became a heated one, both internationally and in Norway, in the spring of 
2007. The IPCCC-report was published that year, and the year before The Stern 
Review had also been released. IPCCC had a key message that the climate threat 
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was more far-reaching and urgent to address than we then knew. The Stern-report 
told the political leaders that these issues could be solved if we take quick action. 
It was further argued that this could be done in a cost-effective way. An effort 
towards halting the deforestation rate was especially highlighted as one of the 
most cost-effective measures. “Low hanging fruits” became a new term in 
climate discussions. 
 
Al Gore was, at the same time, touring the world with his Academy Award 
winning documentary, An Inconvenient Truth and book, An Inconvenient Truth: 
The Planetary Emergency of Global Warming and What We Can Do About It. 
Gore and the IPCCC were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize “for their 
efforts to build up and disseminate greater knowledge about man-made climate 
change, and to lay foundations for the measures that are needed to counteract 
such change”.26 The Prize was handed out in Oslo at the end of 2007, a year 
which stands out as the year both Norway and the rest of the World became 
aware of, or rediscovered, climate change as a severe threat to the planet. A way 
of putting this on the agenda was to give the prize to these two individual and 
institutional advocates. 
6.2.2 Pre-Bali Period 
In Norway, this period was dominated by a build-up of political pressure against 
the government. Both the political opposition in Parliament and the civil society 
with its environmental NGOs were joining forces to push the government to 
deliver ambitious climate targets at the upcoming COP-13 conference in Bali, 
December 2007. This period can therefore be called the Pre-Bali Period. I have 
                                              
26 http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2007/index.html 
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asked all my informants about the pre-Bali process. There are some events that 
are reappearing in my interviews with new importance. My informants all put 
forward the above-discussed Stern Report from 2006 and the IPCC report from 
2007 as a crucial scientific basis for the Norwegian political decision process. To 
save the rainforests was, as mentioned above, seen and emphasized particularly 
by Sir Nicholas Stern as one of the most alluring and economically efficient 
measures. REDD was thus seen as a low hanging fruit. The question therefore 
concerns what lies behind such an assumption. 
 
As far as I could discover through my research, the idea was first launched in a 
Norwegian context during the work on the NOU 14:2008 “Samstemt for 
Utvikling” (United for Development). This was an official report and discussion 
paper prepared on behalf of the government in the period 2006-2008. The idea 
behind the report was to investigate how Norwegian politics in general affected 
development in poor countries (NOU14:2008). Both Lars Haltbrekken, who is 
also the chairman of Friends of the Earth Norway, and Anne K. Grimsrud (The 
Centre Party) were part of the comittee working on the report. They were, 
together with Julie Christensen from The Conservative Party, responsible for the 
working group on climate and energy. According to Grimsrud, the REDD-
suggestion was seen as a first step towards a model for climate financing from the 
rich countries. 
6.2.3 The letter from Lars and Lars 
Lars Haltbrekken joined forces with RFN and their leader, Lars Løvold. They 
suggested, in a letter in autumn 2007, a REDD-proposal to the Minister of 
Finance, Kristin Halvorsen (The Socialist Left Party) and the new Minister of 
Environment and International Development, Erik Solheim. The proposal that 
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was launched was based on the cost estimates made by the Stern Review and it 
was suggested that Norway could offer 10% of the global pot, which in numbers 
meant NOK 6 billion a year. They also went to the opposition in the parliament, 
where the Conservative Party found the idea very attractive right from the start. 
Political adviser for the Conservative Party, Lars Andreas Lunde, explains that 
the arguments from the Stern Report and the environmental NGOs were 
important for why they found it attractive.  He emphasises how actions to halt 
deforestation can give big climate gains in proportion to how much means you 
put into it, and refers to how REDD as the individual measure that can reduce 
climate emissions by 20 per cent. The Conservative Party saw it as a very 
efficient climate initiative at a relatively limited cost. Lars A. Lunde continued to 
explain: “If there is something Norway has, it is money” and saw it as a good idea 
to use some of the Norwegian oil fortune on a very cost-efficient international 
climate initiative.  
 
RFN had at this point been working on the issue for a long time. They had 
already in 2003-2004 been informed, through a cooperating organisation in Brazil 
(ISA – Instituto Socioambiental), that the linkage between climate and forest was 
interesting. RFN then gradually realised, based on what was going on in research 
and different national and international political currents, the role which 
emissions from deforestation and degradation play in the global emissions. They 
were also concerned about how the rainforests and its ecosystems are in 
themselves dependent on a stable climate to be preserved as such. RFN then saw 
this connection between climate and rainforest and further, the REDD-initiative, 
as a new tool to achieve what they had been fighting for for almost 20 years. 
“REDD is a new political agenda that has appeared, and can provide money 
to protect and save the rainforest”, says Nils Hermann Ranum in RFN. 
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The initiative from the two NGOs therefore originated not only from RFN‟s 
contact with cooperating NGOs abroad and the realisation that to connect forest 
and climate could be a new way to get funding for an issue that was relatively 
neglected for a long time, but also originated in Lars Haltbrekkens' work with the 
NOU 14:2008. The letter, often only referred to as “the letter from Lars and 
Lars”, was in many ways perfectly timed, since the government had just started 
the negotiations towards the Climate Settlement (Klimaforliket) in the parliament. 
The Climate Settlement is the political compromise on environmental and climate 
policy between the governing parties and the three oppositional parties: the 
Conservative Party, the Christian Democratic Party and the Liberal Party
27
. The 
negotiations took place in autumn 2007, and was signed and settled in January 
2008. The mentioned NGOs, RFN and Friends of the Earth Norway, were also 
working with the opposition in parliament, especially the fraction leader from the 
Conservative Party, Børge Brende. Based on both conversations with the NGOs 
and the knowledge from the Stern Review, Brende put forward this suggestion in 
the negotiations in the energy and environment fractions in the parliament. It was 
in this fraction that the three opposition parties tried to agree on a common 
platform before the negotiations with the government. The idea was based on 
almost the same assumptions as the suggestion by the NGOs. The Stern Review 
had suggested that deforestation could be halted, if you used approximately $10 
billion a year, over a period of 5 years. $10 billion dollars, approximately NOK 
60 billion, was then visualised as a transfer from the rich countries in the world to 
tropical rainforest countries. The logic was then that the four big Nordic 
countries, as rich countries of the world, participated with 20% of this amount, 
i.e. NOK 12 billion. The Norwegian contribution was therefore NOK 3 billion 
                                              
27 The Progress Party was not included in the climate negotiations, but some of my informants argue that they 
probably would have supported a REDD-initiative, despite their general scepticism to aid. 
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over a five year period. This was half of what the NGOs suggested be granted by 
Norway, but still a relatively large amount of money. NOK 3 billion is 10 % of 
the total aid budget. 
 
One element that is worth mentioning from the negotiations is that there was 
some dissent between the government and the opposition. One issue was the 
tempo of the appropriations. The government was, according to Lars Andreas 
Lunde in The Conservative Party, more concerned and eager about putting up 
institutions and liable structures before actual money was granted. The opposition 
was more impatient and pushed for granting of money from day one. This 
condition was accepted. Another demand, especially put forward by the Christian 
Democratic Party, was that this REDD money should be in addition to existing 
aid; REDD-funding should not come at the expense of the fight against poverty. 
This was accepted in principle; REDD is seen as part of the regular aid budget 
but is considered as additional and will not come at the expense of regular aid. 
But a reduction in other aid funding in the coming years could then create a new 
political debate on REDD vs. regular aid efforts. The aid NGO, Norwegian 
Church Aid, is concerned about this combination of aid and climate efforts. They 
see REDD as a climate and environment initiative and  that it therefore should be 
under the environment budget. Erik Solheim‟s reply to this is that REDD is “very 
good environmental protection, but also good development aid. We are not taking 
anything from healthcare, education or other aid initiatives. Rainforest comes on 
top”28. 
                                              
28 Original quote from VG 20.05.2010: Satsning på regnskog er meget godt miljøvern, men også god utviklingshjelp. 
Vi tar ikke fem øre fra helse, utdanning og annet innen bistand. Regnskog kommer på toppen.  
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6.2.4 The COP 13 conference and Stoltenberg’s transformation 
The suggestion by Brende was approved by the three parties and put forward in 
the negotiations with the government, where it seems that the Socialist Left Party 
was the strongest advocater of a similar suggestion. On Thursday 13
th
 of 
December 2007, during Prime Minister Stoltenberg‟s speech at the COP 13 
conference, the proposed demands from the opposition were met. My informants, 
especially in the NGOs, all expressed surprise over the amount of money 
promised. They imagined that it would be far less then they had suggested. 
Processes like these also tend to take several years, from when the suggestion is 
put forward to the actual granting of money. In REDD‟s case it both went really 
fast - about three months - and the money the government granted was more than 
they could have ever dreamed of. This is really unusual for such processes. 
 
It is difficult to obtain detailed information, but one thing that has come up 
through my interviews and also in media is the way REDD was pushed forward 
by The Socialist Left Party in the government. The Labour Party and Prime 
Minister Stoltenberg were, according to some sources, against the suggestion at 
first. Lars Haltbrekken says that from what he knows, Stoltenberg opposed the 
suggestion until the last minute. It was the Socialist Left Party and the Minister of 
Finance, Kristin Halvorsen, and the Minister of Environment and International 
Development, Erik Solheim that were first contacted by the NGOs, and with their 
support, combined with pressure from the opposition in the parliament; it was 
then probably quite difficult for AP to turn the initiative down. It is interesting 
therefore, to see how Stoltenberg managed to turn his scepticism to eager 
enthusiasm throughout the fall of 2007. What could have made this turning point 
in Stoltenberg‟s way of reasoning? Was it the pressure inside the government 
from a convinced Minister of Finance from the Socialist Left Party, Halvorsen, 
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and an eager new “Super Minister”, Solheim, in the Ministry of Environment also 
responsible for international development? Was it the pressure from the NGOs, 
or was it, as one informant suggested, actually the Ministry of Finance who saw 
this as a nice opportunity to facilitate the inclusion of forests in a future offset-
market? And how can we understand how rainforests in a couple of months in 
2007 suddenly became a close to number one international concern for Norway? 
What was so attractive about it, that an almost united parliament, bureaucracy and 
civil society embraced such a vague and challenging initiative? Or was everyone 
really as impressively optimistic as seen on the surface?  
6.2.5 The institutional process 
In spring 2008 the government was thus in need of an institutional framework for 
the initiative.  A project group was appointed in April, and it was situated in the 
Ministry of the Environment (Miljøverndepartementet - MD). This group is now 
referred to as the Climate and Forest Secretariat (Klima og Skog Sekreteriatet - 
KOS). When the location of KOS was planned, there were several alternatives, 
but it was decided that the Ministry of the Environment would house the 
secretariat. My informants have commented that this location was anything but 
obvious and the decision was not made without discussion. It could have been 
placed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Utenriksdepartementet - UD) where the 
funding is channeled, but may be more natural in the Norwegian Agency for 
Development and Cooperation (NORAD). It has been indicated that this conflict 
was troublesome and went to the top of the different ministries to be decided. It 
can also be connected with the old conflict-ridden relationship between NORAD 
and UD. A reform in 2003 initiated by then Minister of Development, Hilde 
Frafjord Johnson, left the agency reorganised and wing-clipped when many of its 
employees were transferred to UD and many of its functions were transferred to 
the embassies. The relationship between Ministries and agencies has often been 
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characterised by a dynamic power struggle where the agencies are more or less 
free-speaking organs in different historical contexts. It is said that Frafjord 
Johnson wanted more control over NORAD, which at that period was headed by, 
as some would say, a strong leader, Tove Strand (1997-2005). 
 
The composition of the secretariat is interesting in itself. Hans Brattskar was 
appointed leader of the secretariat. He came from the UD and is a former 
ambassador in Sri Lanka.  The rest of the group is composed of people from UD, 
MD, businesses, NGOs and research institutions. No one was recruited from 
NORAD - something that, considering the focus on development aid, sustainable 
win-win-win solutions and pro-poor and indigenous development would perhaps 
seem natural. Not to say that NORAD did not take part in the process. They take 
part and are now responsible for the allocation of funding to the NGO. The 
overall impression is nevertheless that they are left somehow in the outskirts of 
the processes in the initiative. “Where we would have liked to be a substantial 
contributing part, we sometimes felt that we were more like event arrangers” says 
one aid bureaucrat.  
6.2.6 An unusually swift process  
The process was at this stage moving really fast. Some argued that it was too fast. 
Jens Stoltenberg‟s trip to Brazil was already planned for mid-September of 2008 
and NORAD was asked in May to put together a team who could find out if it 
was appropriate to move on with Brazil. The first answer was no, and that if 
certain actions were not taken, money over the aid budget could not be used. The 
things that had to be done in Brazil were not done in time, so they were lagging 
behind slightly.  The same process had to be done with the Congo Basin Fund. 
NORAD had talks with the African Development Bank only ten days before 
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Stoltenberg signed the deal with Gordon Brown in London. “You just had to rush 
around and make desk studies”, one of my informants said. All this was before 
KOS really was up and running. When KOS started to become operative, most of 
the activity was transferred to KOS.  
 
During this process a lot of the work was done after the fact. In the case of 
Guyana, the Minister of Environment and International Development had decided 
to sign the deal before the formal decision document was even made. These sorts 
of documents usually have to go through the system in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs before they are settled. This was also the case in Brazil where the Prime 
Minister signed the deal before the official decision document was ready. One 
Norwegian aid bureaucrat uses this as an example of how this initiative is a top-
down political driven initiative where the system has to adjust in retrospect. In 
many cases the bureaucracy felt more like they were „rubber stamping‟ than being 
actual policy designers. The bureaucracy then felt that they were lagging behind 
the political decisions which came from the top level. “This is unique in this 
context”, said one of my informants.  
 
These small examples show how incredibly and unusually fast the Norwegian 
REDD-process has gone. In less than a year, forest and climate had climbed from 
the bottom to the top of the ladder of importance in Norwegian climate and 
development policies. The Norwegian REDD-initiative is the biggest single 
initiative in Norwegian development aid and amounts to almost 10 per cent of the 
regular aid budget
29
. It is also visible through my interviews how this initiative 
was top-driven, with no deep foundation in the bureaucracy. “There were not 
                                              
29 See Jørn Stave from NORAD in Aftenposten: http://www.aftenposten.no/klima/article3662518.ece 
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many people involved in making a first note on this” says one Norwegian aid-
bureaucrat. The informant admits also that such an initiative never would have 
come from the bureaucracy. Every normal aid reaction would become visible and 
turn the initiative down, says an interviewee. It is also interesting to see how 
NORAD, with its expertise on development and aid issues, was left out of the 
actual implementation of the initiative quite early on. KOS was located in MD 
and the money came from UD. NORAD was left with the allocation of NGO 
funding. They also have an advisory role towards UD and KOS.  
 
Most of those I interviewed see more or less the same nightmare scenarios for the 
REDD-future, but thus at the same as they are acknowledging them, they are 
similarly insistent on the notion that we have no choice but to try; and are 
pragmatic optimists.Allthough NORAD is the most critical articulated voice, 
people in KOS are also in agreement with NORADs concerns; the importance 
of socio-economic measures, focus on alternative livelihoods, respect local 
and indigenous rights etc; all this has to be a central part of REDD-policies, 
says Inger Næss in KOS. KOS therefore see the problems, but they do not see it 
as an argument for not trying. Perhaps bureaucratic pragmatism is an appropriate 
term to label this phenomenon with. The common way of phrasing their 
arguments is: “we know it‟s difficult, but we have no choice but to try”. This way 
of phrasing suggess that their choices are limited by political pressure from above 
and, as loyal bureaucrats, they are left with no choice then but to work in the 
direction their political leaders, or “masters”, are pointing. Solheim is eager to 
deliver in this field and is often referring to how there is no time to waste and that 
we can‟t wait: “I totally agree (…) that this is urgent. We can not wait until “the 
perfect monitoring system” is ready before we give money to countries that wish 
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to reduce their deforestation”30 Or: “There is still more carbon in forests than in 
the atmosphere, and we have no alternative but to try to keep it there.”31. 
6.2.7 Allocation of Norwegian funds 
The allocation of funds through the Norwegian climate and forest initiative 
started in 2008 and is scheduled to increase every year. The funds are distributed 
through both multilateral institutions and bilateral agreements. The World Bank-
led Forest Investment Programme (FIP) and Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 
(FCPF) are, together with the UN-REDD Programme and Congo Basin Forest 
Fund (CBFF), the main multilateral recipients of funds. Tanzania, Guyana and 
Brazil have bilateral agreements. There are also some allocations to civil 
society
32
. In the UN-REDD programme there are, as aforementioned, nine pilot 
countries: namely, Tanzania, Zambia, DR Congo, Indonesia, Papua New-Guinea, 
Vietnam, Paraguay, Panama and Bolivia. Some of these countries are almost 
entirely new partners for Norway. Papua New-Guinea, Congo and Guyana in 
particular are examples of countries in which Norway historically has not had 
much involvement and thus has a lack of knowledge and local contact points. The 
REDD-initiative has therefore led Norway in the opposite direction to their 
development goal of fewer engagement areas and fewer partners.  The 
Development Assistance Committee‟s (DAC) peer review of Norwegian 
development cooperation from 2008 criticised Norway for not focusing on a 
manageable number of priorities. They write, for example: “Norway needs to 
ensure that the process of identifying objectives is strategic and well managed, 
                                              
30 Original quote in Dagens Næringsliv 09.09.2008: Jeg er helt enig med Kjetil B. Alstadheim i at dette haster. Vi kan 
ikke vente på at "det perfekte overvåkingssystemet" er på plass før vi gir støtte til land som ønsker å redusere sin 
avskoging. 
31 http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/cif-green/2009/oct/08/redd-norway-brazil-climate-changeF 
32 See attachment 1 and 2 for more detailed information. 
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both centrally and at partner country level. The process must lead to a 
manageable number of clear and focused priorities. Norway will need to resist the 
temptation to add new ad hoc initiatives to an ever-expanding list of priorities”33. 
The concern in the Norwegian parliament that the geographical dispersal of new 
projects can result in more thinly distributed aid and less substantial impact is 
also commented upon in the same report. At the same time REDD funding is 
often not given to the poorest countries, and this is also in contrast with the 
government‟s aim to concentrate allocations more directly to the poorest of the 
poor. This shift away from the poverty focus from the current administration has 
been criticised by both development NGOs and researchers
34
. 
6.3 REDD and poverty reduction 
The question of whether REDD is a good tool for poverty reduction or not, is 
central to what some describe as tension between the institutions. The current 
leader of the project group, Hans Brattskar, is at first a bit reluctant to 
acknowledge a tension but later explains the different standpoints as follows:  
“Our challenge is to explain how this [REDD] fits together with traditional 
development aid. Are climate and forest efforts something different than 
traditional Norwegian aid? Is this poverty oriented? Some will say yes, this is 
different, since we aim to pay for results. Others would question whether this is 
this the same as giving money to schools and healthcare. I would say that this is 
very useful and poverty oriented aid, because those who first will live with the 
consequences of the lack of water and fertile soil when the climate changes are 
the poorest of the poor. Standing forests reduce the probability of dangerous 
                                              
33 http://www.oecd.org/document/47/0,3343,en_2649_34603_41833003_1_1_1_1,00.html 
34 See for example: Tvedten, Inge (2010): Bistandens Hamskifte. 
http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kronikker/article3498504.ece. 
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climate change and protect water resources and against soil erosion, and are 
essential for the livelihoods of many poor people. So in this way, REDD is also  
poverty orientated”.  
Brattskar thinks that these discussions around whether REDD is also 
development aid, which is found both inside and outside of the bureaucracy as 
well as internationally, come up because people are afraid that REDD will come 
at the expense of regular aid-funding. The above quote from Brattskar is then 
partly connected to the dissent from the opposition in the climate settlement. He 
is still, however, quite clear; that REDD is very useful and poverty oriented aid. 
This is probably not completely agreed upon by NORAD. I in turn, find it 
interesting how poverty so often is used as a central element in REDD-rhetoric. 
The question is whether the poor people in tropical areas are welcoming and 
wanting such an initiative, know about their central part in REDD-discussions 
and justifications or know what REDD actually is. And are we so sure that this 
huge allocation of funding will actually reach the people living in these often 
very remote areas of the world? 
 
A term that is often used when talking about REDD is “high risk sport”. For 
example, Hans Olav Ibrekk, a Policy Director in NORAD says: “This will be 
extremely challenging to establish and operationalise, and it is a great risk. 
What we have done is a high risk sport, but as I mentioned before it was our 
masters who sent us in this direction”.  Ibrekk calls REDD a high risk sport 
because we are not sure it will work, and perhaps Norway will end up spending a 
lot of money and prestige on a complete failure. Put this can also be seen from a 
poverty perspective and a timely question is then: High risk sport for whom? Pål 
Vedeld, professor at NORAGRIC, analysed REDD from a poverty perspective 
and said in an interview: “Brattskar and [his people] (…) talk about this as some 
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sort of risk sport. It is no risk sport; it is about life and death for the people 
involved. (…) This is no sport; it is every day life for poor people in developing 
countries”. It is important to note that Ibrekk and Vedeld are not opposed on this 
issue. Vedeld sees NORAD as the institutional advocator of this poverty 
perspective. He sees how Brattskar and the other people working in KOS often 
lack perspectives on poverty. 
 
In the win-win-win and inclusive rhetoric surrounding REDD, poverty issues are 
only seen as a possible co-benefit. But, according to Vedeld and others a REDD-
initiative can also have negative impact on the situation for already marginalised 
people. Vatn et al. (2009) see many different obstacles for a triple dividend 
success. They first note that we have to keep in mind that if the money allocated 
through REDD is no more than the opportunity cost, there will be no actual net 
benefit. This makes a poverty alleviation strategy in REDD less comprehensible. 
There are, nevertheless, also many obstacles to reaching the poorest people in 
remote forest areas. Since REDD-payments are connected to property rights, 
money could end up at levels above the poorest of the poor who are often used in 
REDD-rhetoric. If we look at the history of other conservation programmes and 
CDM projects, the exclusion of local communities could also be a possible 
outcome. These processes contribute to marginalisation and poverty more than 
pro-poor development. Similar programmes to secure ecosystem services have 
shown that they can lead to reduced future livelihood opportunities for rural poor 
people. The resources made less available by programmes such as these are often 
hard for poor people to replace (Vatn et al. 2009:34). They also add that REDD, 
with a substantial flow of money from the global North to the global South and 
connected to demand for land, will increase land prices and in turn make it hard 
for poor people to get access to land. Vatn et al. (2009:vii) are then arguing that a 
pro-poor policy has to be designed for REDD. It is therefore natural to ask why 
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the expertise on pro-poor development in NORAD is only partially included in 
Norwegian REDD-strategies, why so few people with a development background 
sit in KOS and why independent research is not prioritised. 
6.4 Expensive and difficult, not cheap and easy  
“It is through initiatives against deforestation that we will get the biggest, quickest and 
cheapest cuts”  
Jens Stoltenberg, 25.05.2010
35
 
Returning to my informants in the Norwegian bureaucracy, they are all, as 
mentioned earlier, using the Stern Report as an important foundational 
knowledge base and argument for why the initiative came about. As already 
noted, the report states that efforts towards stopping deforestation and 
degradation could be the most cost effective tool to use against climate change. 
REDD is therefore seen by Jens Stoltenberg, as cheap, quick and easy – a so-
called low hanging fruit. The Stern Report is nevertheless disputed and Arild 
Vatn at NORAGRIC explains in an interview how it is based on a relatively 
simple calculation. He denies the assumption that REDD will be easy and cheap. 
“At least it‟s not easy”, he says. “It is very demanding to establish systems to pay 
for reduced deforestation.”  
 
While my informants acknowledge the report‟s importance, they all 
simultaneously argue against such easy fix assumptions. Inger Næss in KOS says 
that REDD will not be quick, but the most cost efficient compared to other 
measures. She adds that it will not be easy, but we do not have any 
                                              
35 Quote from the Oslo Climate and Forest Conference 2010. 
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alternative – we have to try. Thus, not quick, not easy, but the most politically 
realistic aim Norway can achieve in climate politics. Hans Brattskar underlines 
that; “it is wrong to say that this [REDD] is cheap and easy, it is expensive and 
difficult, but it is possible to do it”. This is the understanding that has been gained 
and developed over time. After the first rush of enthusiasm reality had then sunk 
in and it has become clear that this will be neither cheap nor quick and easy. The 
paradox is that during the same period of acknowledging how difficult this will 
be, REDD has achieved broader and increasing support. Even Erik Solheim, 
responding to criticism in the Guardian,
36
 says he is well aware of this not being 
easy: “I have no illusions this will be easy; however, when it comes to 
greenhouse gases, there is no such thing as business as usual – either we deal 
with this together, or the battle against climate change will be lost”.  Solheim is 
here putting up a somewhat different image of REDD than we can find in 
Stoltenberg‟s rhetoric. There is therefore some divergence in how the two 
ministers talks about the REDD-initiative. 
 
As mentioned above, the argument which follows is that, even though REDD 
could end up as both expensive and difficult, that cannot be a good argument for 
not trying.  As Inger Næss said: “it will not be easy, but we do not have any 
alternative – we have to try”. Per Mogstad at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs says: 
“because something is difficult that is not a valid reason for not trying to do 
something about it”. The NGOs are also on the same track here. Nils H. Ranum at 
RFN says, for example, that it is far from certain that REDD will succeed, but we 
still have to try. “Yes it is complicated and it will take some time and it is not 
certain that it will succeed either” Ranum maintains. Lars Haltbrekken at Friends 
of the Earth Norway says there is a lot in the climate context that can end up 
                                              
36 http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/cif-green/2009/oct/08/redd-norway-brazil-climate-change 
74 
 
being things we do not like, but that cannot be a good reason for not doing it. 
This is therefore the consistent argument used by both bureaucrats and NGO-
activists. In the bureaucrats‟ case, we see a combination of political instructions 
and climate reasoning behind the argument. The environmental NGOs stress how 
the climate threat forces us to take rapid action, but both actors argue in support 
of poverty reduction and development. 
 
It is also important to my informants to emphasize that REDD is still a learning 
process. They argue that there will be failures in all attempts to create 
international cooperation in new areas. We therefore have to start this difficult 
task, and try and sometimes not succeed. There is no recipe on this, but we work 
with international actors with important related competence and do our best to 
make our common efforts work, says Hans Brattskar. RFN also sees the 
Norwegian REDD-initiative as a learning process. Nils Hermann Ranum 
maintains that this initiative is simply trying out which projects work and which 
do not. It is therefore quite impossible to grasp what the project will end up 
being, and therefore even more difficult to create critical argumentation around it. 
But this may also be part of the answer to why so many different actors have and 
still are in support of REDD: they all have different dreams of what it could turn 
out to be (including, for some, a „market-based‟ vision).  It may therefore be 
important to keep the project at this level for a longer period, so that some of the 
actors will not end up with broken dreams. This way of talking about the 
initiative is therefore both keeping different dreams alive and making it harder to 
argue critically against it. 
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6.5 Political realism  
Political realism is a central point upon which many of my informants try to 
explain why Norway saw REDD as an attractive idea. This is closely connected 
to the cost-efficiency argument from the Stern Report. Inger Næss says for 
example: ”within political realism this [REDD] is one of the  things we can do 
which will give the quickest results, and in that context, compared to other 
initiatives, it is cost-efficient”. Lars Andreas Lunde, the political advisor for the 
Conservative Party is also on this track. He explains that REDD is “actually more 
cost-efficient than many of the measures we have to take in Norway. Many of the 
Norwegian measures will be terribly expensive. The rainforest is thus an example 
of a measure that has a significant effect and is at the same time not expensive in 
comparison with Norwegian measures”. 
 
But what lies beyond this idea about cost-efficiency in the Stern Report? The 
report has met different types of critique. One of the most vocalised has been 
from its own dominating discipline, the economists. They argue that the report 
overestimates the present value of the costs of climate change and uses the wrong 
type of discount rate. I will nevertheless leave this issue aside and focus on a 
more fundamental critique which can also be extended to a broader critique on 
what we see as both cost efficient and politically realistic change. Arild Vatn at 
NORAGRIC explains in an interview that the argument on how cheap this will be 
is based on simplistic ideas about cost efficiency. “To the extent that REDD is 
low cost compared to other climate measures, it is not least because poor people 
sell cheap”, says Vatn.  
“Although using land to produce food is of vital interest for them, the value of 
their production in monetary/dollar terms is very low (…). So if we buy a hectare 
of forest land in Africa to protect it, we do not need to pay much. This is so, even 
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if the alternative is to produce food that people need. Because African farmers are 
poor, land has low „value‟”.  
The fact that the people who will be affected by and are central in different 
REDD-strategies are poor is therefore influencing the results from the Stern 
Report that show that this is a cheap and cost efficient climate measure. Looking 
behind the logic of cost efficiency reveals a relationship between poverty and 
wealth that is striking. Thus, behind ideas about political realism and cost 
efficiency lies the very aspect of distribution of wealth and poverty. Both why 
REDD is fronted as a low hanging carbon fruit and what REDD will look like in 
the end is deeply imbedded in the matter of which people it is that are affected by 
different features of the initiatives and where they are placed in different 
hierarchies of wealth and inclusion in the global economy. It is within this 
context that we have to place Næss' and Lunde‟s statements on political realism 
and cost-efficiency, and consequently also the whole Norwegian reasoning 
around REDD.  
6.6 Who to blame, whom to pay? 
There is little reliableinformation on the different drivers behind deforestation, 
but what we know is that there are huge geographical differences among a 
diversified tropical hemisphere. In the tropical forests of Guyana the mining 
industries are the main threat. In Brazil the most important drivers are soy and 
meat production. In Indonesia, Malaysia and Papua New Guinea it is a 
combination of plantations (palm oil or paper production) and large-scale 
logging. A vast deforestation in Africa has yet not occurred, but we can find 
many examples of degradation. These are all mainly industrial drivers, but in all 
regions you can also find more or less substantial deforestation resulting from 
local needs for firewood, grazing land and slash and burn farming. These 
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different drivers are very diverse, complex and interconnected. It is therefore 
difficult to single out who to blame and then again whom to pay in the REDD-
architecture. The trend is, however, that poor forest dwellers are often targeted. 
The signals sent out, for example, from UN-REDD activities in Indonesia show 
that it is several millions of subsistence farmers in Sulawesi who are being 
targeted, not any of the few but powerful industrial drivers. Both NORAD and 
RFN are critical to this REDD-development. Ibrekk in NORAD is asking why 
UN-REDD targets subsistence farmers at Sulawesi when it is the big palm oil 
plantations and paper mills that should be targeted. Ibrekk is therefore very often 
highlighting the need to focus on the political economy in REDD-politics, 
referring to the power structures behind the different decisions made in the 
REDD-process. In the case of Indonesia it may seem clear that the interests of the 
big corporate industries and the close connection between the government and 
these interests has dominated the decision making process. On a larger scale, 
such a focus must also realise how neoliberal ideas and interests are influencing 
the international process on REDD. It is important to be aware of these neoliberal 
ideas and practices, which I presented in the theory chapter, that have dominated 
conservation and development for the last few decades. 
 
Nils Hermann Ranum at the RFN is also worried about this development. He says 
that there are signals that indicate that many countries want to target the poorest 
small-scale farmers. The main reason behind this is not that this is easy, because 
it is not, Ranum says. He thinks this is because the subsistence farmers are seen 
as a harmless target group and they will never challenge, for example, the 
Indonesian government in any way, “but if the plantation industry or the logging 
industry is targeted the same government would very soon end up in a conflict 
with themselves or someone they know very well. This is because of the 
penetrating system of corruption you can find in Indonesia”. There are many 
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difficulties related to targeting the millions of subsistence farmers. First, it is a 
very heterogeneous group and therefore difficult to both change their way of 
living and to have a good communication with. Secondly, it is not obvious that 
these are the ones who actually are the main drivers behind deforestation, neither 
historically nor in the future. As Ranum mentions, slash-and-burn farming can 
actually be a sustainable and carbon neutral use of the forest. It was not this 
which left Sumatra completely ruined and without any forest. “The plantation and 
the logging industry did that”, he argues. 
 
So the paradox/dilemma is as follows: the poor tropical forest dwellers are both 
deeply embedded in the Norwegian REDD-rhetoric and also targeted in many 
pilot REDD-initiatives. But confronted with forest realities in Indonesia, three 
million subsistence farmers are neither the easiest target group for changing 
forest-use practises, nor are they the actual key drivers behind deforestation in 
Indonesia.  
6.7 Norway – A mediator between the Global North and 
South 
Another interesting dimension in my empirical data is how my informants see 
Norway as a negotiating actor between the global North and South. In a relative 
extension of “The Regime of Goodness” and “The Land of Difference”, my 
informants are always referring to Norway as somewhere between the global 
North and South. Brattskar refers to how Norway has shown leadership in the 
climate negotiations on REDD and that Norway is a promoter of important issues 
such as stakeholder involvement and safeguards against conversion of natural 
forests. He continues explaining two concrete demands developing countries are 
putting forward in the international REDD debate; how REDD-funding can not 
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be given at the expense of regular aid-funding nor at the expense of climate-
efforts in developed countries. These viewpoints are in line with the Norwegian 
stance on these issues. Norway has nevertheless not delivered on national climate 
targets,  but the demands from developing countries are aimed at developed 
countries in general. In this case Norway regards itself as only having a small part 
of this global responsibilty.  
 
Lars Haltbrekken also refers to this when discussing what sort of advantage 
Norway has in succeeding with its REDD-initiative. He says that we have earned 
a lot of money while emitting climate gases. That is why we owe it to the world 
to put a small amount of our money into initiatives like REDD. But he adds one 
more Norwegian advantage; Norway has more confidence internationally since 
we are not part of any of the power blocks in the world and can therefore have a 
more independent voice. Interestingly enough, Haltbrekken is here explicitly 
placing Norway on the outside of the power blocks of the world; more 
independent and with more international confidence from developing countries. 
These are the same power blocks that Nustad (2003) is arguing that Norway has 
to be seen as an active member of. This belief that Haltbrekken is putting forward 
is very representative in the rhetoric about Norway as a humanitarian superpower 
and fits perfectly with the earlier mentioned quotes in Witozsek‟s (2010) article 
where Norway is seen as small, different and impeccable. The different actors see 
a Norway that is operating freely, independently and altruistically in a space 
outside the dominating power blocks - a seemingly apolitical space where we can 
speak with a golden tongue to defend a global good. The split in the tongue is 
nevertheless not revealed. 
80 
 
6.8 REDD and carbon markets 
One of these ambiguities regards what sort of initiative REDD will be in the end. 
Many influential actors see REDD as a bridge towards bringing forest into a new 
market mechanism. Michael Jenkins, the president of the international but 
Washington based NGO, Forest Trends, explains in an interview
37
 that COP 15 
was a huge disappointment, not only for environmentalist and policy makers, but 
also for the carbon market and a lot of the big financial institutions. The only 
interesting thing that came out of Copenhagen, he says, was “that forestry became 
the “Promised Land”. It is especially ironic since three years ago forestry was in 
the same category as nuclear, you couldn‟t trade it (…) and now, coming out of 
Copenhagen, forests were one bright light that I think will translate into an 
agreement on forest at the next COP”. He further sees how, at this place in the 
process, public finance has to be a bridge between where we are today and 
towards a future where significant private sector involvement is in place. The 
public initiative - which Jenkins calls public investment  in forest and climate – 
not development aid, will thus be a facilitator for a future, more market based 
solution. Jenkins is certain that we are in a period with growing investment in 
forest and climate. There is no question that REDD will become part of an 
eventual market system, he says. The question is what this market will look like, 
and which institutions and countries will take part. 
 
The Norwegian government is not denying such a statement; but they stress that 
in the current situation REDD is not seen as a so-called offset mechanism, and at 
the same time adds that no one knows what will happen after 2012. The Minister 
for Environment and International Development, Erik Solheim, partly agrees with 
                                              
37 http://print.news.mongabay.com/2010/0503-michael_jenkins_interview.html 
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Jenkins. Solheim explains
38
 that Norway, at the next COP meeting in Mexico, 
will offer support to start forest conservation with public funds, to later turn to 
market solutions. “In the longer term market solutions can become relevant to 
raise funds from the private sector”. Solheim is thus not rejecting market 
solutions in the long run, but “REDD is today seen as an altruistic initiative to 
protect and sustain global goods, funded with money which is not giving us 
anything in return in terms of national of carbon accounting” said Hans Brattskar 
in my interview. He added that one important issue now is to create more 
enthusiasm around REDD and a hope for getting REDD included in a new 
climate regime. There are some contradictions here. The big question is how and 
when will REDD transform itself from an altruistic development initiative and 
into a market based offset mechanism? What will then happen to the new, 
unusual alliances? 
 
The NGOs, who have enthusiastically supported and partly initiated the 
Norwegian REDD-initiative, are, however, totally rejecting a scenario in which 
REDD becomes an offset mechanism. Nils Herrmann Ranum in RFN thinks it is 
irresponsible to include rainforest protection in an offset mechanism where rich 
countries can avoid cutting emissions in their own countries if they pay for forest 
protection in the South. He is certain that this doesn‟t necessarily have to happen, 
“but if it does happen would that be very sad and then we have to try and fight 
it”, says Ranum. Lars Haltbrekken at Friends of the Earth Norway says that they 
are in disagreement with the Norwegian government on this issue, and that there 
will be a fight over this sometime in the future. Truls Gulowsen at Greenpeace 
Norway sees a great difference between what Norway writes, what the 
Norwegian forest experts see and what Jens Stoltenberg really wants and says 
                                              
38 Ny Tid 16.04.2010. 
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about REDD. Stoltenberg is in his rhetoric close to a market based forest 
approach. Gulowsen sees himself as an optimist and thinks that the Norwegian 
initiative is made in support of preserving a global good, but adds at same time 
that it can not be ruled out that Norway will demand something in return some 
time in the future. “If Stoltenberg uses REDD as a method of getting cheap 
climate quotas, there are many people who will feel deceived”, concluded 
Gulowsen. 
 
There therefore exists a certain degree of discrepancy in the different actors‟ 
visions for a future REDD-regime. On the one hand you have the international 
carbon market and different states such as the USA and Australia who see the 
latest REDD development as a “Promised Land” for a new offset mechanism, and 
you also have Norwegian policy makers who probably have conflicting visions 
about how close they want REDD to move to turn into an offset mechanism. In 
addition, you have the Norwegian NGOs who will feel deceived if REDD ends 
up as new system to continue polluting. And finally you have the developing 
countries themselves, and how they envision a future REDD-regime. 
6.9 No Critique 
“Today, the NGOs are not a corrective. I do not have any bruises on my leg, and I 
want to have bruises on my leg” 
Hans Olav Ibrekk , NORAD. 
By investigating the Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative it has become clear 
that the way the initiative was presented in the beginning, for example by Prime 
Minister Stoltenberg in Bali 2007, has clear limitations and can also be accused 
of being detached from reality. His comment about how we all have the 
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technology to not cut down trees is, at this stage in the process, only made fun 
of
39
. It has become clear that REDD-initiatives around the world will be difficult, 
expensive and take a long time to develop and accomplish. In addition, you have 
other debates about REDD and the carbon market and the neoliberal dimension in 
conservation.  
 
The fact that the bureaucrats acknowledge this is interesting, but even more 
interesting is that there are few critical voices towards the initiative. A public 
debate is almost invisible. The natural question will therefore be: why? It is 
natural to relate this to the close connection between the KOS-secretariat and the 
NGOs who normally serve the role of watchdogs in a democracy. Terje Tvedt 
(2003) has described this thoroughly in his books on Norwegian development 
policies and what he sees as a Southern Political System. He describes a system 
of national corporativism where the claimed civil society is more closely linked 
to bureaucracy than the word “civil” actually suggests. Tvedt (2009:34) argues 
that the system is marked by close ties between different civil and public actors in 
the system. These ties are again eased by elite circulation, where few people 
circulate between important jobs in the system, where the same people allocate 
resources inside the system without transparency.   
 
One informant has also suggested that the current government has unusually 
close ties to the Norwegian civil society. The fact that The Socialist Left Party is 
in government and has the Minister for Environment and International 
Development, has made it excettionally easy for civil society to obtain an 
                                              
39 This was, for instance, observed at a REDD conference arranged at Litteraturhuset in April 2010, where different 
REDD actors were part of a panel debate on REDD. 
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audience. The people working in the NGOs are seen as a core group for the party. 
In the case of the Norwegian REDD initiative, these central environmental NGOs 
have had good political access and been listened to. In addition, they have been 
granted a lot of money. A 2009 overview of NGO funding reveals that the RFN 
and WWF Norway have grown very rapid in a few years. From 1999 – 2009 
RFN‟s aid grant has increased from NOK 12 million to NOK 82.9 million. WWF 
aid grants increased from NOK 5 million to NOK 56,5 million.
40
  
 
My informants confirm that close connections exists, and some are more critical 
to this phenomenon than others. Once again, it is NORAD which has a critical 
position. Hans Olav Ibrekk in NORAD, explains the love-hate relationship that 
usually exists between NORAD and the Norwegian civil society, where the 
NGOs‟ comment on what NORAD does. In the case of REDD, however, these 
organisations are invisible to NORAD: 
“In NORAD we are worried about the fact that we do not see the civil society as 
taking corrective measures against what we do. I have told the [Norwegian] 
NGOs directly, in conversations like this one, that before, my leg was always full 
of bruises since I was kicked continuously by the NGOs. Today the NGOs are not 
a corrective. I do not have any bruises on my leg, and I want to have bruises on 
my leg, that drives our agenda too. (…) The NGOs are not exercising their critical 
role today; at least I do not see them. We miss that in NORAD. We miss it and 
feel that now that we are the ones who have to pose the critical questions” 
NORAD is consequently feeling relatively alone in confronting the REDD-
system in a corrective capacity. In principle, NORAD is supposed to provide 
independent, evidence-based advice to UD and the Norwgeian embassies abroad. 
                                              
40 Development Today 9-2009. 
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Ibrekk is here describing his frustration over the situation. It is difficult to know 
how this frustration can be understood. One of the questions is whether critical 
comments from NORAD are only invisible because they are not directly involved 
in the initiative. Or if they are actually not visible to anyone, because all the other 
actors are happy with the status quo and do not see the need to act as corrector 
and watchdog. One suggestion is that the connection between the involved 
NGOs, in this case especially the environment NGOs, is so close that the critique 
is happening behind closed doors; and that these doors are closed to NORAD as 
well as the rest of the public. A third suggestion is that there exists some critique 
within the system, but because they are so closely involved in the Norwegian 
REDD-initiative the critique is not as harsh as it would have been if they had 
chosen to stay outside the process.  
 
My informants indicate that public debate about complicated issues like REDD is 
not always the best for the case. Inger Næss is for instance saying that there is 
more internal discussions and critique than we can see in the Norwegian media.  
She describes the relation to the NGOs as close and constructive. The NGOs are 
often invited to meetings and seminars and join KOS-delegations on fieldtrips, 
example to Guyana and DR Congo. They are also often in contact by email, for 
airing views back and forward and exchanging information. She thinks the NGOs 
feel that they are  included in the process in a good way:  
“If we get critique from the NGOs, as today from RFN, about concerns for 
corruption or indigenous rights then this is articulated in such a way that it is 
good and constructive. . That is the role of NGOs , to be a  watchdog and 
critical. That is a corrective  we want to have” 
As we see, Næss is happy with the way the NGOs operate as a watchdog. And 
she does not agree with the allegation put forward that there are too close ties 
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between the KOS administration and the NGOs. She prefers direct internal 
critique from the NGOs. 
 
The question then is how all of this is seen from the NGOs‟ standpoint? Nils 
Herrmann Ranum in RFN agrees with Næss that there are some messages that are 
complicated to get through in a public debate. At the same time he admits that 
there is obviously a pain threshold on what they can accept from the Norwegian 
government. He add that until now the Norwegian positions has been one of the 
best compared to other countries such as Australia and the US which are both 
wanting a more offset oriented initiative. Norway wants a broader definition of 
forest and sees forest as a part of a future carbon marked. Norway and RFN 
disagree on these two issues. Ranum do not see the close relation between RFN 
and KOS as servile:  
“If you actually see what we have done it is hard to accuse TRF to be a 
servile organisation who jumps every time Solheim or any of his employees 
tell us to do so. I think that‟s really hard to document, but I think it is very 
easy for me to document the opposite” 
 
While Ranum refuse that RFN is a servile organisation, he is more eager talking 
about their actual political influence: “We believe that RFN is listened to and 
taken serious, mainly because we have many years of experience and a wide 
network of partners working in key countries for the Norwegian government‟s 
climate and forest initiative. We have close contact with the unit that is working 
with this from day to day, and have insisted on having that position”. He adds that 
TRF at the same time actually are one of the few milieus that have in-depth 
competence on forest in Norway. “Despite that it is not humble to say this, I 
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believe RFN in many ways knows more about tropical rainforests and how 
important it is for forest-dependent peoples than the Norwegian 
government/authorities does”, says Ranum. RFN has over twenty years‟ 
background from working in these, for Norway, new areas of the world. 
Expertise and local connections and contacts in countries such as Papua New 
Guinea, DR. Congo and Guyana are rare in Norway. RFN‟s expertise is therefore 
valuable for the KOS-secretariat. So, where some see the close connection 
between RFN and KOS as a sign of servility, the two actors themselves see it as a 
constructive win-win situation where expertise and networks are traded for 
political influence and participation and a source of information exchange. I 
would nevertheless argue that there are some disturbing signs of power arrogance 
in their rhetoric. This is especially visible when they express their worries that 
there are messages that are too complicated to put into a public debate.  
 
Despite Ranum‟s emphasis on a good and dynamic relationship between RFN 
and KOS, he is still aware of the lack of public debate: “There is really not a lot 
of discussion on this issue in Norway right now”, and this is a risk for such an 
important issue, he says. But quickly adds that the international debate should not 
be exaggerated: “There are a few good articles every now and then in the papers 
like Guardian, New York Times and BBC, but the actual problem is that there in 
general are a lack of public discussion around REDD”. 
 
This does seem to be the case. There is very little discussion about REDD in 
general, particularly in Norway, but why the debate is absent is not only a result 
of the close ties between the Norwegian bureaucracy and the civil society. There 
have to be other explanations. One explanation could be that there are still a lot of 
unsolved questions about what sort of initiative REDD will end up being. The 
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flux and fixity of the REDD-discourse or architecture creates a space of unity 
between all involved actors. They all have different dreams about the REDD-
future but as long as the process is still evolving, these dreams can live side by 
side in a multifaceted initiative. This is also visible in the Norwegian context; the 
reason why Friends of the Earth Norway, WWF Norway, Rainforest Foundation 
Norway, Greenpeace Norway, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance , Jens Stoltenberg, Erik Solheim and the 
rest of the government and all political parties in the parliament (including The 
Progress Party) still see REDD as a good idea and initiative is because we are still 
in the vague and blurry birth of the initiative. The question is,  how long the 
different actors can claim that we are still in this long lasting facilitating period 
for? And then we also have to ask ourselves: who will end up very disappointed 
and be the “loser” this time? 
6.10 Why should REDD succeed where development 
has failed? 
The implementation of REDD is confronted by many of the same challenges and 
obstacles as classical development interventions are and which it has not 
managed to confront for several of decades. Corruption, governance and rights 
related issues related to both property and indigenous people are just a few of 
many areas where REDD has to be a game changer to succeed. Ibrekk is worried 
about this and points out how every index, whether it is on democracy, 
governance or corruption, shows that the countries Norway is entering now are 
coloured dark red all over the map. The red colour indicates a high degree of 
corruption, lack of democracy, transparency and a lack of stable institutions etc. 
Countries such as Indonesia, Papua New-Guinea and DR Congo are among the 
most difficult areas to operate in and even Amazonia is often referred to as the 
green Sicily. “I do not think we have realized how difficult it is to actually 
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achieve game changing development in these kinds of countries”, says Ibrekk. It 
is also important to mention that there is in general a relatively poor track record 
on how development aid actually can and has contributed to game changing 
institutional change.  
 
Why then should REDD succeed where development aid never has succeeded. 
Inger Næss in KOS says there are two reasons why REDD has to be seen as 
something else than regular aid and therefore have a greater chance of success. 
The first reason is because it is performance based. That means that there, in 
phase three of the initiative, will not be transferred any money before the given 
country can prove that they have reduced their deforestation rate compared to a 
historically reference level [which will be adjusted over the years to come.] . This 
in turn will work as a safeguard so that money will only be disbursed it verified 
results are delivered.  In the framework for implementing REDD+ there will be 
developed measures to monitor both reduced carbon emissions and the 
safeguards such as stakeholder participation, benefit sharing and anticorruption 
measures. . The other argument is that there, in the case of REDD, will be granted 
such a substantial amount of money that it will be  a real alternative to the current 
deforestation activities and  interesting for the  Ministries of Finance in the 
cooperating countries. Hopefully  this will lead to a substantial game change.   
 
The question is then wheter this actually is something new? Will the amount of 
money have decisive significance for a potential REDD success? Have not 
decades of different development regimes, initiatives and projects proven once 
and for all that the transfer of money does not solve big political and structural 
challenges such as deforestation? It is doubtful that the large amounts of money 
put into this project make it a completely new way to think about development 
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aid. It is also doubtful how a performance-based system will change anything, 
and what will happen if someone does not deliver what he or she has promised. 
Who will then put force behind this performance-based system? Arild Angelsen 
argues at REDD-seminar that we also have to keep in mind that there exists a 
certain need, as with regular development aid, among the donors to get rid of the 
money as in any other aid transaction. A more theoretical element of this is how 
such a performance-based mechanism, with monitoring via satellites and laser 
technology, creates an enormous regime of control. In REDD‟s case it is the most 
remote areas of the world who, through this, get a new global connection of 
developmental and neoliberal control.   
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7. Why REDD will continue on 
”This is the most important thing we do in the World. It is the largest thing Norway 
contributes to and it is the only element in the climate negotiations where something is 
happening”41  
Jens Stoltenberg 25.05.2010 
Prime Minister Stoltenberg was enthusiastic about REDD on the opening day at 
the Oslo Climate and Forest Conference 2010. This quote illustrates both how 
important REDD has become in international climate negotiations and how 
important it is for Norway to contribute in this area. The Climate and Forest 
Conference in Oslo is the latest manifestation of the Norwegian REDD-
involvement. I started my discussion with an image of Soltenberg, Solheim and 
Carlos Minc in the Amazon and asked why they ended up there. I have tried to 
put together the history behind their stroll on the remote Amazonian path. This 
question can be expanded to ask why and where this stroll will continue. The 
Norwegian REDD-story is the story of an initiative that has been established in 
an extremely top-down and swift process. Many of my informants use good 
timing as an explanation of why the „letter from Lars and Lars‟ became so 
influential. It was not the letter as such that made the tropical forest change in 
Norwegian climate policy, but rather it was all the simultaneous circumstances 
that were pointing in the same direction in 2007. Two influential reports (Stern 
and IPCC) had pointed to immediate action and anti-deforestation measures as 
one of the important target areas. The Stern Report was focusing on low hanging 
fruits on a tree of cost-efficiency. The Norwegian political leaders saw this fruit 
and saw the tree also as a tree of political realism. But this political realism was 
related to the Norwegian political landscape. The institution which knows the 
                                              
41 http://www.dagbladet.no/2010/05/26/nyheter/miljo/politikk/jens_stoltenberg/erik_solheim/11869214/ 
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most and has expertise on what can be politically realistic in the involved 
recipients‟ countries was, after a while, put on the sideline and not directly 
involved in the project. NORAD, who I find has the most critical remarks and 
thoughts about the Norwegian REDD-initiative, has no direct day-to-day 
involvement with the Norwegian REDD-process. The secretariat (KOS) was 
placed in the Ministry of Environment and very few people with development –
background were hired. This has nevertheless not made the people in KOS blind 
to the difficulties of implementation, they are aware of the challenges and clearly 
distance themselves from the political rhetoric used in particular by Prime 
Minister Jens Stoltenberg about how cheap and easy this will be. They are 
nevertheless saying that REDD will be more politically realistic compared to 
measures Norway can take at home. And here we are approaching a key reason to 
why Stoltenberg changed his mind before Bali, why he was so seemingly happy 
on that Amazonian path and why he, in May 2010, invited the world to Oslo and 
was called “the king of the forest” by the Norwegian press. They realised that 
REDD could be the perfect compromise. A compromise not only in the 
Norwegian political landscape between environmentalists and political realists, 
but also a genuine compromise internationally where the climate challenge could 
be met with a tool that Norway already understood very well: the transfer of 
money from the Global North to the Global South through, in Norway‟s case, 
development aid. To use development aid created another win for the Norwegian 
policy makers who support a 1 percent goal in the Norwegian aid-budget. The 
win-win-win equation is then more accurate to apply in the Norwegian political 
context than perhaps in a tropical rainforest country. With REDD, Norway has 
moved a problem out of its original context and placed it where problems of the 
North often are solved: in the Global South. The Norwegian economy and 
Norwegian employment rates are not influenced - that would not be politically 
realistic. The people affected by REDD live in remote forest areas not equally 
attached to the global economy, and thus also in realms that are more cost-
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efficient and politically realistic to target. What I have tried to say throughout this 
thesis, however, is that there are some issues not taken into account in these 
myths and narratives about how REDD can fix the climate challenge, save 
biodiversity and create sustainable development. There is a deeper critique that is 
interesting to investigate, and here we can make use of my theoretical framework 
to identify what ideas can be traced to be lying beneath the whole initiative. 
 
I argued in chapter 4, drawing on the work of post-development thinkers, that an  
intervention such as REDD are not smooth and apolitical, but rather full of 
friction and very political. While Ferguson (1994, 2006) and Nustad (2003) see 
this phenomenon related to poverty and Sachs (1992) also includes the industrial 
exploitation of the environment, it is  also appropriate to use the same method of 
reasoning when talking about deforestation, conservation and REDD. Liza 
Grandia (2007), writing about the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor (MBC), 
mentions how these big internationally-funded conservation programmes use 
inclusive win-win rhetoric to satisfy all involved actors, but at the same time 
ignore “the obvious causal factors of extractive deforestation like oil drilling, 
cattle ranching, logging, export-plantation agriculture, inequities in land 
distribution, and many other market activities that primarily threaten protected 
areas in Central America”. The interesting parallel is that the developers in the 
MBC-programme insist that the key cause of deforestation is that the nature‟s 
market value is not yet recognised.  
 
In this lies some of the essence of what I wish to say. There is some sort of 
exclusion and a more or less deliberate obscuration of global developmental and 
environmental connections. Whether it is called global connections, messy 
encounters, global friction or power relations, all of these terms are in opposition 
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to the smooth idea about the global market, developmentalism and an idea that 
the commodification of nature is an unruffled and apolitical process. A process of 
veiling occurs when trees and carbon are transformed into tradable objects and 
entities. In this way, all the other aspects of this transaction are encapsulated 
inside trees and carbon and one can get the impression that the World has turned 
into an apolitical and smooth operating machine. By insisting on commodifying 
nature while ignoring the causal links between global capitalism and 
deforestation, the rainforests are delinked from the factual global encounters that 
are unfolding every day.  
 
Despite this parallel, the REDD-discourse is in some ways significantly different 
from the more classical conservation interventions and therefore trickier to 
explain. Both because the actors involved in REDD understand it as different 
things and because history has not yet shown us what it will be, it is even difficult 
to single out what the REDD-discourse is. Where in the previous example it 
could be argued that simultaneity is not recognised, the REDD-discourse has 
clearly advocated for a global approach to the climate challenge. The climate 
challenge is in itself a global concern with global implications and solutions. It is 
therefore important for, among others, Norwegian policy makers to assure their 
audiences that we need a global approach to the challenge. This is why Norway, 
for example, invests in the development of cleaner technology in coal plants in 
China and tries to halt deforestation in tropical forest nations. In this manner of 
reasoning we find a global understanding of complex and interconnected 
challenges. What I nevertheless argue is that this global understanding is limited. 
„Simultaneity‟ in the analysis is to some extent recognised when the climate 
challenge is being discussed. The climate challenge is seen as global in scope 
when there is a possibility for Norway to argue that it is reasonable to put efforts 
into cutting emissions from deforestation or in cleaning emissions from coal 
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power plants in China. But other global climate dimensions, are rarely part of the 
official analysis; for example, Norway‟s position as a petroleum economy with 
huge national interest in the global petroleum market. Norway is then performing 
some sort of schizophrenic exercise – denying and embracing a global vision at 
the same time.  
 
As Anna Tsing (2005:88-89) states: “to „think globally‟ is no easy task. To 
recognise the globe as a relevant unit for our imaginations requires work”. Yet 
the Norwegian politicians in government and opposition try to do exactly this in 
their solutions to climate change. The reasoning is that the best efforts to halt the 
climate change takes place where it is most cost-effective. With arguments 
constructed around ideas about cost-efficiency combined with political realism, 
Norwegian policy makers are experts in global thinking. It doesn not matter 
where we put in our efforts, the climate threat is global, and solutions are 
therefore also found globally. This is why it is natural for Norway to find their 
climate measures outside Norwegian borders, whether they are implementing 
green technology at Chinese coal plants or anti-deforestation initiatives in 
Indonesia or Brazil. Norway is in this way moving the political challenges out of 
a Norwegian domestic context and takes action  elsewhere where it is more 
politically realistic and cost efficient. In relation to REDD, it is possible to argue 
that REDD is, in a sense, a technical/economic fix on a grand scale – which 
thereby obscures the unequal relations between the global North and the global 
South. 
 
Thus, it can be argued that thinking globally -  and, at least implicitly, 
acknowledging „simultaneity‟ - is kept within strict bounds by the Norwegian 
government; Norway‟s global impact is only recognised where Norway is 
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actually contributing to a global good. When Norwegian action has negative 
global impact, causal links are often ignored and not taken into account. If we 
look at the rainforest, this limited acknowledgement of „simultaneity‟ may be 
exemplified by how the Norwegian Prime Minister, Jens Stoltenberg, in one 
moment is called ”the king of the forest”42 because of his engagement in the 
REDD-initiative, and in the next is responsible both historically and as a current 
leader for the Government Pension Fund Norway which invests in companies 
such as Chevron, Samling and Wilmar International
43
, all responsible for major 
deforestation and degradation activities. In addition, we have the inevitable fact 
that Norway is a major oil exporter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
42 http://nrk.no/nyheter/norge/1.7140837 
43 See for example: http://www.nbim.no/Global/Documents/Holdings/EQ_holdings_SPU_Sorted_09.pdf and 
http://www.regnskog.no/Nyheter/Nyhetsarkiv/Regnskogfondet/1619.cms  
97 
 
8. Concluding remarks   
“In Copenhagen we discussed the effects of climate change; in Cochabamba we 
discussed the causes” 
Evo Morales, May 2010
44
   
I have in this thesis attempted to explain how the fundamental reasoning behind 
REDD neglects important perspectives. These are perspectives of simultaneity, 
perspectives on local complexities and perspectives on alternative pathways and 
strategies to sustainable development. REDD is attempting to give a top-down, 
technical and easy answer to what, in the end, is no less then a fundamental, if not 
civilizational, question of our time. Once more, the answer from the global North 
obscures alternative pathways to sustainability and the causal links behind 
climate change. Norway is a global business actor and earns money on 
environmental degradation whether it is tar-sand in Canada or gigantic gas-power 
plant and aluminum production in Qatar. During the spring of 2010, Norsk 
Hydro, a company partly owned by the Norwegian state and other Norwegians 
banks and corporations and Europe‟s third largest aluminum maker, signed a take 
over deal with the Brazilian company, Vale‟s, aluminum business. Norsk Hydro 
has a competitive advantage using Norwegian hydro electric power, but lacks the 
raw materials in aluminum production: bauxite. This need for raw materials has 
led the Norwegian company and thereby the Norwegian state into the world‟s 
third largest bauxite mine, Paragominas. Mining is an important driver behind 
deforestation and the Hydro involvement in Northern Brazil is thus only one 
small example of how Norway, a week before the much publicised Climate and 
Forest conference in Oslo, involves itself simultaneously in the world. By 
                                              
44 Quoted at a public meeting at the University of Oslo during Evo Morales‟ official visit to Norway in May 2010. 
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pushing a huge initiative like REDD as the most important solution to climate 
change, the causality in climate change is obscured. The driving force is that 
global capitalism is in need of resources, here exemplified by the Norwegian 
need for bauxite. This need creates new processes of global encounters and, as 
Anna Tsing (2005) argues, not without friction. 
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